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A common objective 
Jacques Delors 
President of the Commission of the European Communities 
The countries of the European Community needed a common 
objective which could raise their sights above daily routine problems 
and thereby concentrate their energies. It was for this reason that my 
colleagues and I in the Commission proposed to the Heads of State 
and Government and to the European Parliament that we should 
create a truely unified economic area in Europe by 1992. 
This large market without frontiers, because of its size and 
because of the possibilities that it offers for scientific, technical and 
commercial cooperation, gives a unique opportunity to our industry 
to improve its competitivity. It will also increase growth and 
employment and contribute to a better balance in the world 
economy. 
It has a social as well as an economic dimension, and must lead to 
a more unified Community. The twelve Member States have rightly 
decided that it should be accompanied by policies that will lead to 
greater unity as well as more prosperity. They have therefore 
strengthened Community technology policies and enlarged the 
resources available for helping the long-term unemployed, youth 
unemployment and rural development; as well as the backward 
regions of the Community and those facing major restructuring 
problems. 
This large market that we are creating is of direct concern to every 
citizen of Europe. It is revolutionary, but it will be achieved both 
because it is absolutely necessary and because it carries with it the 
goal of a united and strong Europe. 
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Foreword 
Lord Cockfield 
Vice President of the Commission of the 
European Communities 
We are on the move. The programme for the Completion of the 
Internal Market by 1992 is now well under way. The programme 
will be completed, and it will be completed on time. That is the 
objective set by the Single European Act and that is the objective we 
must achieve. 
No one now doubts the importance of the task or the 
opportunities it opens up. 
It was an act of faith - confidence in the present and faith in the 
future - that we - the Community - embarked on this task. Now, 
with the publication of this major study under the skilled and 
dedicated chairmanship of Mr Paolo Cecchini, we are able for the 
first time to see the precise measure of what we are going to achieve. 
Now we have the hard evidence, the confirmation of what those who 
are engaged in building Europe have always known: that the failure 
to achieve a single market has been costing European industry 
millions in unnecessary costs and lost opportunities; that the 
completion of the Internal Market will provide the economic context 
for the regeneration of European industry in both goods and 
services; and that it will give a permanent boost to the prosperity of 
the people of Europe and indeed of the world as a whole. 
The importance of this study, and of what it reveals and confirms, 
cannot be overestimated. Mr Cecchini and his team have laid before 
us, in terms which will be clear to every citizen of Europe, the full 
magnitude of what needs to be achieved in cutting out red tape, in 
breaking down protectionism and removing blocks on cross-border 
activities. 
But it does not just demonstrate the heavy cost of having 12 
separate markets divided by frontier controls. More important by 
far, it also demonstrates the immense opportunities for the future 
which the completion of the internal market will open up: 
opportunities for growth, for job creation, for economies of scale, for 
improved productivity and profitability, for healthier competition, 
for professional and business mobility, for stable prices and for 
Xlll 
consumer choice. In short a prospect of significant inflation-free 
growth and millions of new jobs. 
No other approach to the challenge of Europe's economic future 
could possibly promise so much. No single Member State on its own 
could ever generate such a total transformation of its economic 
performance and prospects. It is only by completing the single 
European market of over 320 million people that we will make those 
prospects a reality. 
The people of Europe have a right to realise the immense potential 
which is at present held in check by our internal divisions. Those 
whom they elect to govern them have a duty to unlock those fetters. 
This report provides evidence of what is at stake, of what we all 
stand to gain if they succeed and to lose if they fail. They must not 
fail us. We must claim our right to the prosperity, the jobs and the 
secure future for generations to come which this book shows are ours 
to create. The political courage and determination must be 
forthcoming. 
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Summary and conclusions: 
High stakes for Europe: the 1992 
challenge- the prize within the grasp 
The challenge 
This book profiles the European Community home market in the 
1990s, the costs of its absence today, and the gains on offer for the 
EC economy as a whole once the costs are converted into benefits. 
Benefits most obviously for consumers and for companies in the 
shape of lower prices and lower costs - but benefits, also, which are 
stamped in social and political coinage. 
Thus, for the first time for nigh on two decades, the 1990s offer 
the outlook of a new springboard for economic policy management 
and for major reductions in chronic European unemployment after a 
short-term adjustment period. It is, we believe, a substantial story 
about a challenging prospect, whose implications spill over EC 
boundaries into the global economy. But it has Europe at its centre 
and its origin. 
The challenge, that of creating by 1992 a single EC home market 
by removing the barriers between its twelve national components, is 
first and foremost a challenge for Europeans. However, if they 
respond robustly, the continent's citizens, companies and govern-
ments will do more than realise their collective economic potential as 
Europeans. They will propel Europe onto the blustery world stage of 
the 1990s in a position of competitive strength and on an upward 
trajectory of economic growth lasting into the next century. Such 
additional growth, following the progressive impact of EC market 
integration, could, in the space of a few years, put between four and 
seven percentage points on the Community's domestic product. This 
vista is not a tantalising chimera. On the contrary, it is a firm 
prospect. 
The research 
The outlook emerges from an unprecedented research programme, 
launched in 1986 by EC Commission vice-president Lord Cockfield. 
Its purpose was to provide a solid body of scientifically-assembled 
evidence as a means of judging the extent of the market 
fragmentation confronting European business and Community 
xvii 
policy-makers alike. In the process, the research has thrown up a 
vivid illustration and rigorous analysis of the costs imposed on 
Europeans by the mosaic of non-tariff barriers which - 30 years after 
the Community's birth - continue to mock the term 'common 
market'. The findings of this research into the 'costs of non-Europe', 
are outlined in their essential detail in the pages of this book. 
The research is unprecedented for various reasons - first for the 
sheer size of its scope, but also because of the novelty of the subject-
matter and the methodological difficulties that were encountered in 
making the analysis and calculations based on it. A further problem 
was the unevenness of the empirical data on European market 
fragmentation. Yet despite these fragilities, the results that emerge 
tell an unmistakable story. 
They estimate the size of the costs and thus a potential for gains 
exceeding Ecu 200 billions. 1 This basic benefit, which could be 
magnified by modestly positive economic policies, is the reward for 
removing the barriers targetted by the 1992 legislative programme 
set out in the EC's 1985 White Paper Completing the Internal 
Market. 2 Thus when EC political decisions are taken and the 
business community has fully adjusted to the new competitive 
environment, gains of this order of magnitude would be acquired 
once and for all, meaning that the European economy would be 
lifted onto a higher plane of overall performance. 
The barriers - like border controls and customs red-tape, 
divergent standards and technical regulations, conflicting business 
laws and protectionist procurement practice - are well enough 
known by name. But not until now has their impact, and that of 
their removal, been charted and costed. These results, the product of 
the extensive field-work and subsequent analysis, are outlined in Part 
I, together with illustrations of the workings of non-Europe in a 
broad range of industries and services. 
Likewise, the White Paper's legislative programme for removing 
market barriers, reinforced since mid-1987 by the Single European 
Act, is also well known. But what has not been estimated until now 
is the value of the ultimate prize which Community governments 
could, by enacting it in full, deliver to Europe's citizens, its 
companies - and to themselves. Detailed estimates of these overall 
gains, and the mechanisms by which they are to be realized, are 
made by two separate but complementary approaches - respectively 
a micro-economic and a macro-economic analysis -and are presented 
in simplified form in Part II. 
The shock and the prospect 
For all the complexities, the essential mechanism 1s simple. The 
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starting point of the whole process of economic gain is the removal of 
non-tariff barriers. 
The release of these constraints will trigger a supply-side shock to 
the Community economy as a whole. The name of the shock is 
European market integration. Costs will come down. Prices will 
follow as business, under the pressure of new rivals on previously 
protected markets, is forced to develop fresh responses to a novel 
and permanently changing situation. Ever-present competition will 
ensure the completion of a self-sustaining virtuous circle. The 
downward pressure on prices will in turn stimulate demand, giving 
companies the opportunity to increase output, to exploit resources 
better and to scale them up for European, and global, competition. 
However, the effect of the shock is to be gauged not just in terms 
of the market, and of the companies and consumers who buy and sell 
there. Its waves will ripple out into the economy at large. By its very 
size, the shock will have reverberations on general economic 
management. Over time, creation of a European home market will 
unbind the macro-economic constraints which have chronically 
fettered the prospects of sustained growth in Europe for the best part 
of twenty years. 
Public deficits will be eased, under the dual impact of open public 
procurement and the economy's regeneration. Inflation, traditionally 
growth's ugly sister, will be cooled down by the drop in prices 
provoked by open markets. The jolt so imparted to Europe's 
competitivity should ensure that growth is achieved without damage 
to the Community's external trade position. 
But, perhaps most important of all, is the medium-term impact of 
market integration on employment. With its injection of inflation-
free growth, coupled with a loosening of the constraints on public 
exchequers in the Community's member states, the European home 
market of the 1990s raises the prospect, for the first time since the 
early 1970s, of very substantial job creation. The added financial 
elbow-room given to governments should, in addition, enable any 
unevenness in the rewards distributed by market integration to be 
compensated. 3 
This medium-term prospect of substantial growth is not just a 
boon for Europe. The world economy of the late 1980s and early 
1990s, overshadowed by American deficits, a fickle dollar and the 
spectre of a US recession, needs to take confidence where it can. The 
expectation may be that a dynamic European market, trading with 
the world on a footing of revamped competitivity, will provide a 
much-needed shot in the arm for other markets and economies in 
less buoyant shape. 
In return, EC governments will have the right to expect 
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appropriate responses from the Community's economic partners 
abroad, notably the US and Japan. If the fruits of the European 
home market are to be shared internationally, there must also be a 
fair share-out of the burdens of global economic responsibility, with 
market opening measures extended internationally on a firm basis of 
clear reciprocity. 
The actors and the opportunity 
The European home market will not materialize at the wave of a 
wand. 1992 will not come by whispering words of mysterious 
Eurospeak into a receding future, or the future will return the 
compliment by staying conveniently out of reach. For business and 
government, the two main actors, the road to market integration will 
be paved with tough adjustments and the need for new strategies. 
For business, removing protective barriers creates a permanent 
opportunity, but signals a definitive end to national soft options. 
Cost reductions will be good news, but market opening means also 
the permanent threat, actual or potential, of competition. This is also 
good news for the company which is gearing up to capitalize on the 
enlarged market's enhanced opportunities for innovation and 
economies of scale. But profits which derive from cashing in on 
monopoly or protected positions will tend to be squeezed. The 
situation will be one of constant competitive renewal. 
Managing change will mean changing management - or rather the 
focus of its business strategy. There is already widespread evidence 
that this is happening, as companies- ahead of 1992 and often way 
ahead of the politicians - are adjusting both their management goals 
and business structures in readiness for new patterns of competition. 
But opportunities must continue to be seized - merely to neglect 
them will create a threat. One thing is certain. Firms from outside 
the EC, who are already positioning themselves in Community 
markets in anticipation of the White Paper programme's success, 
will not miss opportunities overlooked by their indigenous rivals. 
Governments, already being watched closely by business, will be 
expected to give clear signs of their commitment to the 1992 goal. 
The credibility of the European market as an operational environ-
ment for business depends in the first instance on the legislator 
persuading companies of the seriousness of its intentions. There is 
only one way of doing this. EC governments must enact the White 
Paper programme fully and on schedule. In so doing, they will 
release the costs, outlined in this book, which presently inhibit 
Europe's market and economic expansion. 
This means a further role for companies. Business cannot afford to 
sit passively by, idly expecting governments to keep to long-term 
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legislative commitments, unaided. There is a need of more active 
political involvement, in the sense of constructive input to policy, 
orchestrated at Community level but targetted above all at the seats 
of national political power. 
But governments must do more than achieve the European home 
market. They must maintain it - and, once again, give companies 
tangible proof that they are committed to doing so. 
No great insight is needed to see that maintaining market 
integration will in turn pose the Community with some ineluctable 
choices. The business managers of the European market of the 
1990s cannot be indefinitely divorced from the political managers of 
the Community economy. 
Attempting to sustain this unserviceable dichotomy would be to 
invite disaster. Market integration, for example, particularly in its 
early stages, is likely to accentuate pressures on exchange rates and 
thus the need for firm currency management and for a stronger 
European monetary system. Without an institutional framework to 
deal effectively with these and other problems inherent in the success 
of the 1992 programme, the European home market will soon be put 
in jeopardy. The tensions that will be created will not be susceptible 
of management in an institutional vacuum. In short, for Europe to 
meet its market challenge, it must also, sooner rather than later, 
review the overall structure of its economic organisation. 
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PART I 
EUROPE'S 
FRAGMENTED 
MARKETS - THE COST 
FACTOR 

1 The uncommon market: 
'Integration' - 20 years on 
Many will remember the Common Market. 
Not perhaps as a fact, because despite much noteworthy effort and 
several false dawns it has never really materialized. But as an 
ambition which, it was generally assumed, had been substantially 
fulfilled by events like the removal of import tariffs between 
European Community countries at the end of the 1960s, and the 
programme for removing intra-EC technical barriers launched in 
1969. 
By the mid-1980s, the error of this assumption, which business 
had experienced for some time, was beginning to dawn on the 
Community's political leaders. 'Common Market' became a term 
used with growing embarrassment and decreasing accuracy to 
describe the trading and market relationship between EC member 
countries. Events since then are well-known. In 1985 the EC summit 
endorsed the European Commission's White Paper on Completing the 
internal market. 4 This set out a detailed legislative programme for 
creating real home market conditions in Europe by 1992 via some 
300 acts to remove non-tariff barriers. By early 1988, with a third of 
the journey to 1992 over, just under a quarter have been adopted. 
What remains is a daunting, uphill task given the scale of the 
problem. Because today's Common Market, just to give a few 
random examples, is still one where: 
• customs-related costs put a charge on companies equal to a major 
portion of their profits from intra-EC trade; firms in effect pay a 
penalty dividend (around 25% of profits in many sectors) to 
national border controllers for the privilege of going European; 
• industry in areas like motor manufacturing and telecommuni-
cations is losing billions of Ecus because of inefficiencies imposed 
by divergent product standards or protectionist procurement; 
• smaller companies are to a significant extent debarred from 
transborder business activity by administrative costs and regulat-
ory hassles; 
• a bewildering array of price differences faces consumers of 
essential services: car insurance may vary by as much as 300% 
between high and low price countries; tariffs for telephone 
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services can vary 50% from one EC country to another; the range 
of price differences for some key financial services can be even 
greater; 
• the public authorities, year in year out, pay around Ecu 17 ,SOOm 
more than they should in purchasing the goods and services they 
need - because of protective procurement systems over which 
they themselves preside. 
This is just a smattering of the evidence, outlined in greater detail 
in the following pages, as to the cost of the barriers which still 
fragment the EC market- the 'costs of non-Europe'. 
Barriers that have to go 
The basic finding, corroborating that of the White Paper, is that a 
whole series of barriers will have to go if European companies, 
consumers and governments are to be freed from these costs and 
enjoy a real European home market in the 1990s. They fall into three 
broad types: 
• physical barriers - like intra-EC border stoppages, customs 
controls and associated paperwork; 
• technical barriers - for example, meeting divergent national 
product standards, technical regulations and conflicting business 
laws; entering nationally protected public procurement markets; 
• fiscal barriers - especially differing rates of VAT and excise 
duties. 
Getting an accurate feel for which are the worst barriers is 
difficult, but business in the manufacturing sector has supplied its 
own verdict. A survey specially commissioned for the research 
involving 11,000 businessmen, showed that administrative and 
customs barriers, coupled with divergent national standards and 
regulations, are top of the aggravation list (see Table 1.1. below). 
Calculating the costs of Europe's fragmented market 
Of course, these barriers impact with greater or less severity 
depending on the sector. Similarly, the costs linked to them vary 
from one business to another. Thus, manufacturing companies, it 
emerges, are typically worst hit by customs formalities, technical 
regulations and disparate tax treatment. In areas like telecommuni-
cations, energy and transport, protectionist public procurement 
policies tend to sustain high prices and/or inefficient companies. The 
service sectors appear worst hit by specific market regulations which 
impede competition, for example, in insurance, banking and air and 
truck transport. Without necessarily intending to do so, these rules 
4 
Table 1.1 Ranking of market barriers by business* 
Total industry B DK D GR E F IRL I L NL p UK EUR 12 
l) National standards and 2 7 6 2 4 2 3 4 2 
regulations 
2) Government procurement 6 8 8 8 8 7/8 7 2 8 7 3 4 8 
3) Administrative barriers 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 l 1 1 2 1 
4) Physical frontier delays 3 3 4 3 2 4 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 
and costs 
5) Differences in VAT 8 7 5/6 4/5 7 3 6 7 7 8 8 8 617 
6) Regulations of freight 5 4/5 5/6 4/5 3 5 4 8 5 4 5 5 617 
transport 
7) Restrictions in capital market 4 6 7 2 5 7/8 5 5 4 6 6 7 5 
8) Community law 7 4/5 3 6 4 6 8 6 6 5 7 6 4 
Ranks are based on the answers to the question: 'How important do you consider this barrier to be removed?' Range of ranks: 1 (most important) to 
8 (least important). 
B =Belgium GR = Greece IRL = Ireland NL = Netherlands 
DK = Denmark E = Spain I = Italy p = Portugal 
D = Germany F = France L = Luxemburg UK = United Kingdom 
* Source: Survey of the EC Commission (Nerb, forthcoming) 
restrict entry to services' markets at least as severely as differing 
technical specifications do for manufacturing firms, and often more 
so. 
A more detailed estimation of the costs of Europe's fragmented 
markets is outlined in Chapters 2-7. Their source is the research set 
out in the thirteen basic reports undertaken for the cost of non-
Europe research programme (see diagram below). They look 
respectively at the costs of some major barriers which affect all 
business and then at the specific cost impact on selected service and 
manufacturing sectors. 
Thus Chapters 2-5 examine consecutively the costs of 
• red tape and delays created by customs formalities 
• restrictive practices in public procurement 
• the maze of divergent product standards 
• conflicting business and tax regulations hindering transborder 
business activity. 
The last two chapters of Part I then look more specifically at the 
costs of market fragmentation. Their impact on Europe's service 
economy (financial, business and telecom services) is considered in 
Chapter 6, while Chapter 7 probes the cost of non-Europe for 
selected manufacturing industries (telecom equipment, motor manu-
facturing, foodstuffs, building materials, textiles and clothing, and 
pharmaceuticals). 
Taken together, these chapters summarize the first coherent 
attempt at a general insight into the malfunctionings of the 
Community market- or the workings of non-Europe. Inevitably, in 
view of the magnitude and novelty of the task, the results of the 
research are bounded with a degree of caution, but the composite 
picture of unnecessary costs and lost opportunities is unmistakable. 
It is put in overall perspective by the general economic estimates of 
the benefits accruing to the European economy to be found in Part 
II. But already in Part I the picture is one of debilitating costs 
which, if not crippling European businesses at home, ensure that 
they step out to confront global competition with lead weights round 
both feet. 
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E C market fragmentation: the 13 reports 
The costs of non-Europe are analysed in 13 reports* dealing with: 
-multi-sectoral barriers: 
• Customs formalities, including delays imposed on road 
haulage 
• Public procurement procedures 
• Technical regulations and product standards 
• Impediments to cross-frontier business link-ups 
- service sector: 
• business services 
• financial services 
• telecom services 
-manufacturing sectors: 
• telecom equipment 
• automobiles 
• foodstuffs 
• building materials 
• textile and clothing 
• pharmaceuticals 
* References to research in the text refer to the above reports 
except where specified. 
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2 Red-tape and border-related controls -
bad for business, worst for small firms 
The most obstructive barriers to cross-border trade, in the view of 
business itself, are administrative formalities and the border controls 
to which they are so often linked. This emerges clearly from the 
business survey5 in which company executives pinpoint paperwork, 
red tape and frontier checks as high on the list of obstacles 
hampering the dispatch of goods to other Community markets. Not 
all of these barriers are experienced at national borders, but it is to 
them that they trace their roots, and it is they that epitomize best the 
psychological as well as material reality of non-Europe. 
Business, of course, is not the only victim of border formalities. 
Consumers very often have to dig deeper into their pockets for goods 
produced across the border. And the individual traveller has his own 
tale to tell, often of experiences verging on the feudal. People 
travelling as if they were in a real common market can be painfully 
reminded of their false assumptions, and the Commission has had to 
intervene in a series of cases where it appeared that arbitrary 
penalties were meted out for petty documentary errors: 
• a lorry driver, given incorrect documents from a customs agent 
in Dover, was fined FF 60,000; 
• a German employee going on a course in the company's French 
subsidiary had his personal computer confiscated and was fined 
before the Commission intervened; 
• a tourist carrying personal goods declared as a gift was fined DR 
300,000 at Greek customs. 
But it is companies which appear to face the costliest problems. 
These are quantified by the research on customs formalities which 
was itself based on interviews with around 500 firms in six EC 
countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom). The essence of the story is quickly told (see 
Table 2.1). EC-wide, firms pay around Ecu 8 billion in administrative 
costs and delays occasioned by intra-EC customs procedures - or 
getting on for 2% of these trans border sales. Moreover, the turnover 
companies forego as a result is at least Ecu 4.5 billion and possibly as 
8 
Table 2.1 Administrative formalities and border controls- the bill 
Ecu millions 
7,500 
415-830 
4,500-15,000 
500-1,000 
administration 
delays 
business foregone 
Costs 
government spending* on intra-EC customs 
controls 
*On 6-country basis: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, UK. 
high as Ecu 15 billion. Governments get off more lightly, spending 
some Ecu 500m-1000m of taxpayers' money on the human resources 
required to artificially restrict trade. This of course takes no account 
of the profit taxes they forego on the company sales they have thus 
inhibited. 
The direct costs to companies of intra-EC customs formalities 
emerge from an empirical analysis, conducted in the research, of the 
impact of these procedures on transborder consignments made by 
the firms surveyed. It was found that the average cost of these form-
filling checks - occasioned by VAT and excise payments, health and 
veterinary controls etc. (see diagram below)- was around Ecu 67-86 
per consignment at both its export and import phase: in other words, 
a total of Ecu 153, or around 1.5% of the average consignment's 
value. When costs of delays are added to this, a figure nearer to 2% 
is reached. For businessmen with single-digit profit margins, its 
removal might be viewed as a welcome source of increased flexibility. 
The smaller you are the more you pay 
Things are even worse for small or middle-sized companies - the 
very type of firm on which the Community's political leaders have 
lavished repeated words of encouragement in recent years. Customs 
costs per consignment, according to the research findings, can be up 
to 30% to 45% higher for companies with under 250 employees than 
for larger companies. Words of political support, while welcome, are 
not as beneficial to these firms as action to abolish the cost of 
customs administration. 
Such action, including the introduction of simplified customs 
procedures, has begun to be taken by the EC. Three measures were 
implemented on 1 January 1988 which, over time, should make life 
easier for companies engaged in trade across EC borders, namely: 
• a harmonized system of commodity description and coding; 
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Main reasons for border barriers 
• controls caused by differences in VAT and excise rates 
• application of adjustments to farm product prices 
(monetary compensatory amount) 
• veterinary checks caused by divergent national health 
standards 
• transport controls (licenses, compliance of vehicles with 
national safety rules, etc.) 
• statistical formalities. 
• enforcement of bilateral trade quotas and other quantity 
restrictions with non-EC countries for certain goods (eg. 
textiles, cars) 
• the new Community tariff (T ARIC) applying to goods whose 
description is harmonized in this way; 
• the single administrative document - a new trading form, 
replacing an array of others, to be used for the export, import 
and transit of goods over Community frontiers. 
Larger enterprises, it seems, are adapting better to living with 
cumbersome border formalities. This is borne out again by the 
business survey. Big business, which accounts for the bulk of intra-
Community trade, has the size to make the management adjustments 
to benefit from simplified procedures, enabling it to avoid the worst 
inroads of border raids into corporate administration. But there's no 
getting away from the basic fact. The smaller you are, the greater the 
cost of customs-related paperwork, the more you pay - and the more 
you stand to gain by moves to eliminate customs controls. 
Geographical divides 
The big/small divide isn't the only unevenness in the impact of the 
cost of EC frontier checks. There are also some startling geographical 
discrepancies, as shown by a sample of the results thrown up by the 
research (see Table 2.2). 
From the standpoint of the cost of border hassles, the message for 
companies appears clear. The market of the Benelux countries- the 
Belgo-Luxembourg economic union and the Netherlands- is a good 
place to do business. There the costs are lower than for trade 
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Table 2.2 Average costs per consignment in intra-EC trade (ECU) 
Country Imports Exports 
Belgium 26 34 
France 92 87 
Germany .42 79 
Italy 130 205 
Netherlands 46 50 
United Kingdom 75 49 
between Benelux countries and other EC countries, and than for 
other EC countries between themselves. And trade between Italy and 
other countries, according to these figures, is more costly than 
between any other country and the rest of the Community. 
At opposite extremes of the sample are respectively Belgium and 
Italy. In the former, apparently thanks to the simplified documentation 
procedures within the Benelux customs union, there are markedly 
lower customs clearance costs than the average. A special plaudit 
goes to the 'Benelux 50' document which effectively facilitates trade 
between Benelux countries by providing all the necessary information 
for VAT and customs statistics purposes. 
By contrast, the costs of importing into Italy are, at Ecu 130 per 
consignment, precisely five times higher than the estimated import 
charge into Belgium. The high costs found in Italy do not come as a 
total surprise - certainly not to anyone who has pondered the value 
of the control of the huge queues of trucks building back from the 
Italian and Alpine frontiers. They have been prefigured by business 
representations made to the Commission complaining, in particular, 
at the existence of two customs administrations at Italian borders 
effectively carrying out the same checks. The problems caused by 
this double control are further compounded by uncertainties for 
companies caused by Italian sanitary controls. 
The worst situation appears to be the one suffered by a small or 
medium-sized company in Italy seeking to develop markets elsewhere 
in the Community: it is likely, because of the special problems facing 
smaller business, to face an export deterrent even larger than the one 
indicated in Table 2.2 Inversely, smaller firms elsewhere seeking to 
develop the Italian market are not much better off. 
Calculating, from the evidence in the report, the overall customs-
related administrative costs borne by Community business, a round 
figure of Ecu 7.5 billion is reached. To this a further irritant must be 
added. This is a net charge of at least Ecu 415m and at most 830m 
11 
ascribable to the physical delays at borders imposed on Europe's 
road haulage business. This estimate, it should be emphasized, takes 
no account of the cost of delays faced by inland water and rail 
transport. 
Transborder road transport: a long haul made longer 
The problems facing international road haulage operators in Europe, 
as a result of the fragmented Community market, are manifold, 
among them: delays at frontier posts and enforced empty truck 
movements linked to restrictions like national permit quotas and 
those on 'cabotage' (meaning collection and delivery limits on non-
resident hauliers). In addition, beyond these economic costs are the 
psychological stresses caused for drivers by unnecessary delays. 
The Ecu 415m-830m spread in the cost of delays facing hauliers at 
customs posts reflects a number of factors. The upper limit 
represents the total estimated costs of delay. But delay time is not 
necessarily effective time lost, since it is assumed, for instance, that 
hauliers plan to make compulsory driver rest times coincide with 
delays at customs points. Allowing generously for this results in the 
lower, Ecu 415m, figure for costs. 
The impact of these delays on average haulier costs is difficult to 
quantify. But illustrative of their dimension is the example reported 
of the comparative experience of two 1200 km truck trips - one 
within the UK and one from London to Milan. The first took 36 
hours. The second (excluding time lost in the Channel crossing) took 
58 hours. This example6 suggests that frontier delays between the 
UK and Italy amount to a crude increase in transport costs as 
between these two markets of over 50%. 
This is not all. Beyond delay costs are those related to the permit 
and cabotage restrictions which, from a regulatory standpoint, make 
the road haulage sector one of the most illiberal in Europe. Putting 
an authoritative number on these latter costs is also difficult. 
However, what does emerge is the existence of much under-utilized 
capacity in the form of part-loaded lorries, an important element of 
which at least is attributable to commercial restrictions. With the 
cost of such inefficiencies often being passed on, it is the 
Community's manufacturing industry that foots much of the bill for 
the regulations in which the European transport sector has been 
traditionally strait-jacketed. 
American experience 
The costs of a highly-regulated trucking sector - and the benefits of 
removing them - are further underscored by experience in the US 
which, until a recent reform, was also characterized by high 
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transport rates often supported by restrictive practices at state-level. 
By comparison with the EC, the American system now provides 
several competitive advantages to its industry, including: 
• no authorization for interstate trucking; 
• differences in state taxation and regulations not so great as to 
distort hauliers' operating costs anything like as much as in the 
EC (see also diagram below). 
Following the Motor Carrier Reform Act of 1980, which 
essentially did away with the state-based restrictive practices, the 
charge of transport inefficiencies on overall American economic 
welfare appears to have been significantly reduced. The benefit from 
transport deregulation is estimated in the region of US$ 26 billion. 
Road haulage liberalization in the US 
The following benefits have appeared in recent years in the 
more deregulated American states: 
• increased competition has lowered freight rates and 
improved the level and choice of services; 
• hauliers have given new resources to marketing, 
planning and innovation; 
• the total number of carriers has increased, despite 
bankruptcies affecting big and small alike; 
• smaller hauliers have survived, mainly by occupying 
niche markets. 
Lost market opportunities and turnover 
Beyond the direct costs they impose on companies, customs 
formalities and delays also lead to business foregoing opportunities 
which otherwise are there for the taking. This cost in lost intra-EC 
trade, according to the research, is estimated at between Ecu 4.5 
billion and Ecu 15 billion for business in the Community as a whole. 
Unsurprisingly, it is smaller business which feels it suffers most from 
lost sales potential. 
A case in point concerns the mail order business. Because of the 
administrative costs involved, companies which cannot immediately 
achieve an Ecu 1 million cross-border turnover are in a no-go 
situation, and even those who manage this must quintuple sales 
rapidly if they are to keep on the business. Most smaller companies 
throw in the sponge well before this. 7 
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The big spread in the above general estimate for lost trade 
(representing between 1% and 3% of intra-Community trade of Ecu 
500 billion) reflects the differing expectations of respectively the 
importers and exporters surveyed. Exporters expect gains three 
times as great as importers from the removal of customs checks. This 
seems to show considerably more enthusiasm from the export trade 
for what, when it occurs, will of course be a balanced situation. 
There are also big differences between the evaluations made by 
small and big business about the lost sales potential attributable to 
customs compliance procedures. For both imports and exports, 
smaller firms look forward to increases the double of those foreseen 
by their larger brethren. Thus, of the companies surveyed who 
responded expecting trade increases from the removal of border 
controls, those with less than 50 employees expected average 
increases in exports of 26% and in imports of 22%, while the 
expectations of those with more than 500 staff were for 10% export 
and 8% import growth. (The final weighted overall figures are much 
smaller since they take account of companies which forecast no 
change in the present situation.) 
The estimate of trade foregone because of customs barriers needs 
to be put in a broader perspective. It is important to remember that 
even the Ecu 15 billion figure (3% of intra-EC trade) is some way 
below the overall trade gains which company executives expect from 
the removal of all trade barriers (ie not just customs formalities). 
These, according to the 11,000 executives replying to the general 
business survey, amount to an average in the region of 5% of their 
trading figure. 
Public expenditure 
European governments, who have it in their collective power to 
promote business by removing these barriers, also bear a share of the 
direct costs of the syst~;!m over which they preside. For even the 
administration required to keep trade barriers in place has its cost to 
the public purse. Government expenditure earmarked for this 
purpose is estimated by the research at between a further Ecu SOOm 
and Ecu 1000m. 
This estimate, based on an analysis of six EC countries (Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the UK), corresponds to 
between 15,000 and 30,000 staff who are involved in the administration 
of intra-EC customs and tax controls. The assessment takes account 
of a variety of factors, eg the staff still required for national controls 
and for non-EC international trade etc. The upper figure, of 30,000, 
should be seen against the 75,000 currently employed in the national 
customs administrations of the six countries surveyed. In other 
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words, the research does not posit the sudden miraculous dis-
appearance in 1992 of all customs officials, but rather the reallocation 
of those involved in formalities which are counterproductive to the 
functioning of a single European market thereafter. 
Policy responses in the White Paper 
As regards the larger picture of trade costs, EC governments have 
begun to take some of the measures needed to reduce border checks. 
The introduction on 1 January 1988 of the single administrative 
document (Sad) and other customs measures (see above p.9-10) seeks 
to curtail some of the demands of paperwork on EC cross-border 
traders. 
Other measures recently taken by the Community include the 
agreement, reached in principle in June 1986, to move towards the 
phased liberalization of road haulage permits and a quota-free 
Europe in 1992. This decision, which is since proving difficult to 
implement, provides for 40% annual increases in the number of 
Community-wide permits. By 1992 it should be clear whether the 
positive impact of this move has been proportionately as great as that 
apparently achieved by the process of American deregulation begun 
in the early 1980s (see p.l2-13). 
The full programme for deregulating the cross-border movement 
of goods is spelt out for governments in the White Paper's legislative 
programme for 1992. The drag on company sales and profits 
constituted by border controls would, for all practical purposes, be 
eliminated if they adopted the various proposals in the White Paper 
dealing with health and veterinary controls, VAT and excise 
harmonization, the removal of residual national quotas on items like 
textiles and automobiles etc. - in short, if they eliminated all internal 
borders. Equally, until governments grasp this nettle, businessmen 
may continue to perceive transborder trade as much a source of 
costs as an area of opportunity. Downstream of the businessman, the 
consumer is arguably even worse off. For him, customs procedures 
represent perhaps the most explicit and symbolic of barriers 
supporting non-competitive business practices for which, in the last 
analysis, he pays. 
IS 
3 Government protectionism in 
procurement markets- a shot in the foot 
Cross-frontier trade between private-sector business in the EC has, 
despite the many residual obstacles, developed strongly in the 30 
years since the Community's formation in 1958. Not so the public 
sector, whose purchasing programmes, in the vast majority of cases, 
stop still at national borders. 
Yet there can be no doubt about the importance to the EC 
economy of public procurement, about the potential benefits to 
competitive business and the consumer if it were more open, and the 
costs currently incurred because it is not. 
Take its size, for a start. In 1986 total purchasing controlled by 
the public sector (central and local government, their agencies, and 
enterprises with monopoly-type concessions) was worth Ecu 530 
billion (larger incidentally than the ECU 500 billion for intra-EC trade). 
This amounts to 15% of the Community's gross domestic product. 
Of course a hefty portion of the overall figure is earmarked for goods 
and services which are inherently non-competitive, non-tradable or 
are required in quantities too small to come within contractual 
procedures. All the same, the residue for contractual procurement, 
or public markets, is estimated at a sizeable Ecu 240-340 billion 
(equal to between 7% and 10% of Gdp). But only a fraction of this 
smaller total (an infinitessimal 0.14% of Gdp) is awarded to 
companies from other EC countries. 
There are, of course, some good reasons for buying locally - eg. 
lower transport and trading costs, more efficient after-sales service, 
and quicker delivery. However, these should not be exaggerated nor 
disguise the built-in reluctance of purchasers to tender to non-
national suppliers. 
The costs of almost hermetically-sealed procurement practices are 
major and various. By not encouraging intra-EC competition- if not 
by deliberately rejecting it - the public sector pays more than it 
should for the goods it needs and, in so doing, supports sub-optimal 
enterprises in the Community. Certain high technology areas of 
telecoms, power generation, railways and defence are characterized 
by dominant public buyers, very few suppliers and little intra-EC 
trade. Market fragmentation makes European industry in these areas 
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less competitive in world markets than it otherwise might be - and 
has to be to survive with Japan and the USA in the global markets of 
the 1990s. Protectionist support, often portrayed as a shot in the 
arm for industry, is in fact a striking example of governments 
shooting themselves, and their competitive ideals, in the foot. 
Indeed, the European public sector shows substantially the opposite 
behaviour, in the conduct of its own business affairs, to that which 
its leaders in government are repeatedly urging companies to adopt 
in the economy at large. 
Three major areas for cost savings 
In money terms, the potential public expenditure savings gained by 
removing these inefficiencies are, according to the research in this 
area, estimated in a spread of Ecu 8-19 billion for the five countries 
surveyed (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK in 1984). 
These savings stem from the realization of three beneficial effects 
which will occur, according to the report, consecutively: 
• the 'static trade effect' - meaning public authorities buying from 
the cheapest (ie foreign) suppliers (Ecu 3-8 billion); 
• the 'competition effect', leading to downward pressure on prices 
charged by domestic firms in previously closed sectors, as they 
strive to compete with foreign companies entering the market 
(Ecu 1-3 billion); 
• the 'restructuring effect', or the longer-run effect of economies of 
scale, occurring as industry reorganizes under the pressure of 
new competitive conditions (Ecu 4-8 billion). This saving is 
concentrated in certain high tech sectors like computers, 
telecoms, aerospace. 
But this is not the limit of potential benefits. Further items, but 
which are impossible to quantify, include: 
• savings for private sector buyers who · pay less for goods 
(eg. office equipment, building materials) whose prices have 
been reduced by the break-up of restrictive trade practices in the 
public sector; 
• the dynamic effects of greater competition on innovation, 
investment and growth. 
Adjusting the figures upwards for the twelve EC countries, and 
averaging out the spread, total savings estimated at around Ecu 17.5 
billion (or 0.5% of 1986 Community Gdp) would result from open 
public procurement Community-wide. In addition, if defence 
procurement is included (an area not covered by the research 
programme) separate estimates8 suggest that gains of another Ecu 4 
billion could be achieved by market opening in this sector. On this 
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basis, the total cost of non-Europe in public procurement would 
amount to Ecu 21.5 billion. 
Parts of the story behind these figures are illustrated later in this 
chapter by reference to sectors like telecoms, power turbines and 
data-processing. Suffice it to recall here the key conclusion reached, 
namely that around half of the estimated potential savings are 
concentrated in these sectors, and that, as the report puts it: 'unless 
restrictions on public purchasing are swept away, far from strategic 
industries being protected, whole areas of industry which have high 
multiplier effects on other sectors of manufacturing could cease to be 
viable'. 
Legislation no match for protectionist bureaucracies 
In public procurement, the divide between economic reality and 
political appearances is so deep as to be almost hallucinatory. On the 
one hand, as shown above, there is the huge implicit cost of minimal 
import penetration caused by national procurement protection. On 
the other, there is EC legislation, enacted in the 1970s, apparently 
enforcing open award procedures for procurement. The false 
optimism created by Community directives on public works (1971) 
and public supply contracts (1977) is further indulged by the 
facile assurances of the authorities themselves. 'Public purchasing 
authorities', say the authors of the research report, 'generally deny 
that overt nationalistic purchasing policies exist'. 
Several factors explain the gap between liberal appearance 
and protectionist reality. First, Community legislation on public 
purchasing has so far excluded sectors characterized by nationalistic 
procurement for strategic reasons - and where there are in some 
cases large specialist contracts of interest for foreign suppliers. These 
sectors are: 
• energy 
• transport 
• telecommunications 
• water supply 
However, the problem runs much deeper than this. Sectoral 
exceptions are one thing, but more alarming is that EC rules on 
awarding procedures have had very little effect in the areas of 
procurement actually within their scope. The stark fact is that the 
Community legislator has up to now proved no match for national 
and local purchasing bureaucracies. 
Legislation on procurement has not had much direct effect on 
trade because, among other reasons : 
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• there are too many ways to evade the rules or influence the 
choice of supplier during the evaluation of bids; 
• other barriers to trade (like divergent national standards) still 
exist and these lead to price differences, distorting competitive 
bidding; 
• in many countries, purchasing is significantly decentralized, 
making EC transparency rules hard to enforce. 
Reasons for protection 
Avoidance of competition of course has its rationale. Public 
procurement is typically used by EC member states, to support 
national and regional firms and industries either: 
- for strategic reasons (eg. defence, telecoms, aerospace) 
- to support employment in declining industries 
- to compensate local communities near environmentally damaging 
public industries (eg. coal mining, nuclear fuels) 
- to support emerging high tech industries (eg. new telecom 
systems, lasers) 
- or for more general political reasons (eg. highly visible goods like 
cars, tableware). 
Injecting competition into public procurement- new EC proposals 
Faced with the absence of competition and the limited success of 
Community legislation so far, the EC Commission has moved to 
implement the White Paper by proposing to: 
• close down the loopholes in existing EC rules for public works 
and supply markets, thus easing market entry by non-nationals 
• provide companies with legal redress to assert their rights under 
EC rules, and to ensure awarding authorities comply with them 
• extend open awards procedures to currently excluded markets -
energy, transport, telecommunications and water supply - and 
subsequently to bring the service sector within their ambit. 
Potential price savings for specific products 
In order to assess the potential price savings which would result from 
open competition, researchers made a series of calculations, based on 
tested assumptions, relating to a range of specific products in the five 
countries surveyed (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK). 
A sample of the savings to be derived from the combined impact of 
static and competitive effects (p.17) includes: 
Pharmaceuticals: 52% price saving in Germany; 40% in the UK 
Office machinery and instrumentation: 12% saving in France, 27% in 
Italy 
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Telephone switching: 60% saving (Belgium); 40% (France); 70% 
(Germany); 50% (Italy, the UK) 
Telephones: 20% saving (Belgium); 43% (France); 39% (Germany) 
Electrical equipment (weighted average): 17% saving (Belgium); 14% 
(France); 15% (Germany); 14% (Italy); 7% (UK) 
Motor vehicles (weighted average): 13% (France); 4% (Germany); 10% 
(Italy); 9% (UK). 
Coal: a 50% price saving in Germany; 25% in the UK 
The price savings indicated above provide a broad indication of 
the extent to which, in the countries concerned, products are 
overpriced due to protection from competition. Other items for 
which the report identifies substantial gains (25%-50%) as a result of 
procurement liberalization in high price countries include X-ray 
machines (France, Germany, Italy), uniforms (Belgium, France, 
Italy) and filing cabinets (Germany). The report also finds that for 
several products there are no apparent potential savings at all (eg. 
fluorescent tubes, school desks, cement and cardiac monitors). 
Particular impact of restrictions on strategic sectors 
The negative consequence of closed and protective procurement is 
that in certain key high tech supply sectors (capital equipment for 
defence, power generation, telecoms and railways) where public 
authorities are the major purchasers, a symbiotic relationship has 
gradually built up between suppliers and buyers. This economic 
incest is a breeding ground for commercial deformities and deviant 
competitive behaviour. Among the barriers and distortions to intra-
EC trade which such a relationship either encourages or tolerates, 
and whose elimination will be needed effectively to open up public 
procurement, are: 
• widely differing national or exclusive user standards; 
• government subsidies; 
• R&D efforts duplicated, dispersed and sub-optimal; 
• maintenance of companies with little incentive to invest in new 
technologies to confront competition from non-EC firms; with 
shortsighted marketing and production strategies unable to rival 
the Europe-wide strategies of US and Japanese competitors; with 
insufficient specialization and economies of scale. 
Given this, it is no surprise that in most of the key industrial 
sectors the largest world firms are generally US or Japanese. They 
are not just more competitive than Europeans on world markets, but 
are better organized to compete for EC-wide markets. The fact that 
the Community has more companies does not do it much good. It 
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adds nothing to the degree of competition in Community countries, 
because the protectiveness of European national markets merely 
sustains their sub-optimal performance. 
Economies of scale - gearing up for global rivalry 
At present in many key sectors, companies are operating without the 
specialization and size necessary to compete globally. An important 
contributory cause of this is the protection afforded by closed 
procurement. 
The research looks at the gains in product costs and customer 
prices which would result in selected sectors from economies of scale 
triggered by more open competition. Sectors analysed in case studies 
conducted by the research include those which, together with some 
of their main characteristics, are outlined in the following table. 
Generally speaking these industries suffer excess capacity, except 
telephones and mainframe computers. There is also virtually nil 
intra-EC trade, except for mainframe computers (mainly due to 
IBM, according to the report) and public switching equipment 
(mainly due to trade between local European subsidiaries). 
Table 3.1 Main characteristics of some key markets 
Product 
Boilers 
Turbine 
Generators 
Locomotives 
Mainframe 
computers 
Public 
Switching 
Telephones 
Approx 
EC market 
m EGUs 
2,000 
2,000 
100 
10,000 
7,000 
5,000 
Estimated 
capacity 
utilization 
20% 
60% 
50%-80% 
80% 
approx 70% 
90% 
Significance of 
intra-EC trade 
neg! 
neg! 
neg! 
medium to great 
medium 
neg! 
There follows in very abbreviated form the developments which 
the report expects for these sectors in a Europe-wide competitive 
environment, including the price advantages resulting from economies 
of scale in the short and longer-run. 
Boilers 
There is no trade bet~een EC producing countries, and there is 
massive overcapacity. Increased competition in the Community's 
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internal market would lead to some loss in boilermaking capacity, 
reducing the number of firms from 15 (in the five countries 
surveyed) to around four. Unit prices and costs would fall by around 
20%. Changes in national competition policy would be needed as 
well as opening up procurement. 
Turbine generators 
There is little trade, and also some overcapacity. Italy and the UK 
are beginning new power station building programmes, so French 
and German firms would be able to enter these markets. This is 
likely to lead to mergers and acquisitions and rationalization of 
production, reducing unit costs by an estimated 12%, without major 
closures. 
Electric locomotives 
Merger and collaboration agreements are just beginning to occur in a 
sector traditionally characterized by negligible trade. Purchasing is 
opening up, but its impact on intra-EC trade will only slowly follow. 
Over a period of decades, the number of main manufacturers is 
likely to reduce from 16 to about three or four. Unit costs would fall 
by around 13%. Pressure for these changes already exists because of 
changing technology, but they cannot occur without changes in 
public purchasing policy. 
Mainframe computers 
Unlike the three above sectors, this is already a highly competitive 
industry, even if it is largely characterized by indigenous producers 
competing against IBM in each national market. Some continued 
rationalization of the industry is likely, leading to minor savings in 
R&D and marketing, probably worth around 5% of costs. Europe, 
however, now has fewer manufacturers (5 including IBM) than the 
USA (9 firms). 
Public exchange switching equipment 
There are seven different digital switching systems being installed in 
EC countries, five of which were developed by EC firms with the 
protection of national purchasing policies and R&D funding. In 
1987, the price per line was reported as ranging in the EC between 
$225 and $500, compared to around $100 in the US. With open 
tendering the European price would probably fall to around $150. 
Industry has been restructuring rapidly recently to compete for 
national market shares, notably by the emergence of Alcatel as a 
major pan-European firm. With completely open markets there 
would probably be only two firms in the EC in the longer-run. 
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Telephones 
There are many manufacturers of telephones and significant imports 
into deregulated markets (in particular the UK). There are 
substantial price differences, mainly reflecting the high specifications 
for telephones into regulated markets and less sophisticated products 
in free markets. Free competition would drive out expensive 
products and high cost producers, bringing prices down by 30-40% 
in France and Germany. 
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4 Divergences in technical regulations 
and standards - costs difficult to 
quantify but impossible to ignore 
Rated by companies themselves as one of most acute problems they 
face in their European operations (see Table 1.1), disparities between 
national technical regulations and standards are a complex and, to 
the outside observer, an arcane subject. Yet their adverse impact on 
industry seeking to exploit the full dimension of the EC market, a 
priority matter for the Community policy-maker as for the 
businessman, is now widely accepted. 
It is not difficult to see why. In an increasing number of sectors, 
firms will be obliged to survive by selling in quantities much larger 
than are likely to be absorbed by their share of a single, narrow 
national market. To compete, they need to produce on a larger scale. 
To amortize this investment in new plant, and also their spiralling 
expenditure on research and innovation, they need the larger, 
European market. 
National product regulations and standards, however, impose an 
entirely contrary logic. They tend, by their differences, to force 
companies to do what their business strategy tells them is wrong: 
produce for the national market, innovate for the national market. 
Manufacturers are thus often constrained either to limit themselves 
to a sub-optimal market, or to attack new markets via a range of sub-
optimal plants and narrowly relevant technology. Either option 
implies extensive costs - the costs of non-Europe. 
Adverse effects are thus not limited to restrictions on cross-border 
trade. They impact on the core functions of business - production 
and technology. And the costs they incur are often compounded by 
their use in combination with other obstacles to market entry, 
notably restrictive public procurement, eg. telecommunications 
equipment (Chapter 7). Among the worst affected by these and 
related barriers are high tech sectors which are precisely those where 
market fragmentation has a proven track record in putting Europe at 
a competitive disadvantage with the US and Japan. 
Barriers in this field result from differences between EC countries 
for three types of arrangement: technical regulations, standards, 
testing and certification procedures. 
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Technical regulations lay down legal requirements, enacted by the 
national legislator mainly in the interests of health, safety and the 
environment; often these requirements refer to standards. 
Standards are not legally binding in themselves, since they are 
written by private national standardisation bodies like DIN (in 
Germany), BSI (in Britain) and AFNOR (in France). However, 
although standards are only voluntary codifications for products and 
product processes, they often assume a quasi-legal status because of 
their use as a reference in technical regulations and, for example, in 
insurance and product liability claims, as well as in calls for tender 
for public procurement. 
Testing and certification procedures are used to check that a product or 
process complies either with voluntary standards or with statutory 
regulations. If successfully passed, they result in the issuance of 
certificates of conformity. However, a typical problem is non-
recognition by one EC country of another's certification process, 
meaning at best additional testing and at worst an absolute market 
entry barrier. 
Costs: multi-sector impact 
The costs (see diagram below) imposed by these barriers hit 
manufacturing industries right across the board. But they do so in a 
manner which is so sector-specific and which, even then, is often 
inextricably combined with the impact of other barriers, as to make a 
quantified extrapolation at the general level impossible to undertake. 
But on an individual industry basis, the story is clear. It is illustrated 
by the investigations carried out by the research into certain selected 
industries (see Chapter 7). Their results are in turn corroborated and 
amplified by company executives themselves in the general survey of 
manufacturing business conducted for the research.9 
Telecom equipment, automobiles, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals and 
the building products sector are, as shown in Chapter 7, five major 
EC industries where standards and technical regulations, alone or in 
combination with other obstacles, inject heavy doses of inefficiency 
into business operations. 
This is most spectacularly the case in the telecom sector. Here the 
industry's regulators - usually the national PTTs - have traditionally 
sustained their restrictive procurement practices by demanding 
observance of narrowly relevant standards reinforced by 
discriminating certification procedures. The overall cost of these 
mutually supportive barriers is estimated as high as Ecu 4.8 billion. 
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A typology of costs 
- resulting from divergent standards and regulations 
For companies 
• duplication of product development 
• loss of potential economies of manufacturing scale 
• competitive weakness on world markets and vulnerability 
on European markets as companies operate from a narrow 
national base 
For public authorities 
• duplicaton of certification and testing costs 
• not getting value for money in public purchasing, whose 
non-competitive nature is often reinforced by national 
standards and certification 
For consumers 
• direct costs borne by companies and governments means 
higher prices 
• direct and larger losses due to industry's competitive 
weakness and inefficient structure 
The experience of telecom equipment, moreover, is to an extent 
indicative of the massive losses imposed by divergent standards on 
other high technology sectors, where burgeoning R&D expenditure 
can only be recouped by manufacturing products to widely 
marketable standards. 
At the other end of industry's product range, foodstuffs and 
building products have their own experiences to tell. Thus of the 
total estimated costs of up to Ecu 1 billion attributable to market 
barriers in the foodstuffs sector, content and ingredient regulations 
on just four items (chocolates, beer, ice-cream and pasta) contribute 
over 80% (see Chart 7.1). In the building products sector, research 
shows unequivocally that divergent standards and lengthy 
certification (whose procedures can last years rather than months) are 
the primary causes of non-Europe costs estimated in total at around 
Ecu 2.5 billion. Pharmaceutical companies, meanwhile, face serious 
problems and significant costs in getting new products authorized 
and admitted to the market. 
Motor manufacturing enjoys a paradoxical but costly situation. It 
is both the sector where the removal of technical barriers is judged as 
most necessary by business itself (see Table 1.1) and yet the one 
where the Community has had most apparent success in harmonizing 
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technical regulations. As many as 41 EC harmonization directives, 
dealing with specifications for various parts of the automobile, have 
been adopted over the years. But the key problem is that there 
remain three further directives which need to be adopted before full 
EC type approval can be achieved. In the absence of Community 
type approval (which is being held up on political rather than 
technical grounds), and thus of a European certification procedure, 
EC-wide manufacturers are generally being forced into costly 
duplications. 
Product development in the auto sector 
- the supplementary EC Bill 
• No less than Ecu 286m is estimated as the extra bill 
imposed by divergent European specifications etc. on the 
product development costs of a volume passenger car, 
according to a recent study*; 
• Included in this is the cost of meeting differing require-
ments for engineering, production, product planning, type-
approval, certification etc. 
*A report by the Motor Industry Research Unit Ltd 
commissioned by Ford of Europe 
The businessmen's verdict 
The business survey commissioned for the 'non-Europe' research 
programme bears out and supplements these sectoral findings. It 
elicited answers from 11,000 business respondents throughout the 
EC who were asked how important they considered the removal of 
technical trade barriers to be for their company. After weighting the 
responses, the results of the survey, shown abridged in tabular form 
below, indicate the gravity with which technical regulations and 
standards are considered to impact on various manufacturing sectors. 
Table 4.1 Rank (top ten) in descending order of importance of technical 
trade barriers1 0 
1. Motor vehicles 6. Other transport equipment 
2. Electrical engineering 7. Food and tobacco 
3. Mechanical engineering 8. Leather 
4. Pharmaceuticals (and some 9. Precision & medical 
chemicals) equipment 
5. Non-metallic mineral products 10. Metal articles 
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The survey shows that investment goods are viewed as suffering 
more than consumer products from divergent technical trade 
barriers. The table's hierarchy also reinforces some of the principal 
conclusions of the sectoral research. The electrical engineering 
sector, for example, suffers directly from the differing standards 
affecting telecom equipment and other high technology areas. 
An outstanding example of the impact on investment goods of 
differing regulations, particularly regarding safety, is the mechanical 
engineering industry. A proposal made by the Commission in 1987 
seeks to harmonize the safety and other essential requirements which 
affect many companies in the engineering machinery market, whose 
total annual turnover is estimated at around Ecu 200 billion. 
New policy responses 
The problems created for manufacturing industry by divergent 
technical regulations and standards pose a special challenge for the 
European Community. A feel for its scope was provided back in 
1983 11 by the estimate of some 100,000 different specifications 
operating across industry. But the challenge has intensified as new 
regulatory and standardization initiatives have multiplied. This has 
essentially been in response to two pressures - adapting to technical 
progress, and to increased concern for health, safety and the 
environment. 
To meet this challenge, the EC has developed in recent years a 
new, three-pronged approach whose interlocking components, 
described below, are expressed by the following key terms: 
• mutual recognition 
• selective harmonization 
• mutual information procedures 
Mutual recognition 
The aim here is to ensure that business avails itself of its basic right 
to trade within the Community. The objective has been supported 
by a series of seminal judgments by the Court of Justice, which has 
emphasized that Community law does not merely prohibit barriers to 
intra-EC trade, but positively requires the mutual acceptance of the 
goods of one member country by another. In other words, the 
presumption is that goods lawfully produced or marketed in one 
member state should in principle have access to all member states. 
Instrumental in re-affirming this was the Court's 1979 ruling in the 
Cassis de Dijon case, 12 followed by a series of subsequent 
judgments, possibly the most celebrated of which was the ruling in 
1987 on the German beer purity law (see Chapter 7, foodstuffs). The 
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significance of this jurisprudence in legislative terms is to reduce the 
scope and detail of harmonization required at the European level. 
However, mutual recognition is not enough by itself to solve the 
problem posed by technical trade barriers. This is because, in the 
absence of Community legislation, member states may still (on the 
basis of Rome Treaty Article 36) restrict trade in goods which do not 
respect their particular 'essential requirements' - including those 
for health, safety and environmental protection. As a result, 
exporters may be unable to trade a given product across intra-EC 
frontiers - either because they have failed to meet genuine essential 
requirements, or because they are being unlawfully obstructed by 
the use of essential requirements as a covert pretext to stop 
competitive entries to the national market. The latter case may give 
rise to litigation. But the former can only be solved by legislation. 
Selective harmonization 
Here the aim is to replace where necessary differing member state 
regulations on the essential requirements discussed above with 
harmonized Community legislation. This is one of the central thrusts 
of the new approach to harmonization which the EC has followed 
since 1985. It involves dispensing, by and large, with the traditional 
attempts at meticulously detailed harmonization, which were 
difficult to agree and often technically obsolete by the time their 
adoption was finally achieved. 
Besides limiting the EC's legislative effort to harmonizing essential 
requirements, this new approach gives greater leeway to industry for 
choosing how it satisfies them. However, a simple and direct way of 
compliance is to meet the European standards now being set by the 
European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European 
Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC). These 
bodies are mandated by the EC authorities, once essential 
requirements have been harmonized, to develop common industrial 
standards applicable throughout Europe. Thus the detail of 
industrial specification is left for industry, acting through these 
channels, to determine. Acting in conjunction with the 
standardization process, the EC legislator limits himself to meeting 
the legal minimum. 
This policy, as yet in its early days, is already beginning to bite. A 
first EC directive using the new approach was adopted in 1987 (on 
pressure vessels), and progress on proposals for building products, 
toys and industrial machinery has followed. Meanwhile, the 
important standards-setting role now assigned to CEN and 
CENELEC should alleviate the dead-weight presence of national 
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standards in pivotal high technology areas like telecommunications 
and data-processing. 
Mutual information procedures 
Since its adoption in 1983, a Community directive has obliged 
member states to notify new regulations and standards to the 
Commission in advance of their enactment. This gives the 
Commission the power - so far used 30 times in response to 450 
notifications - to freeze introduction of new national regulations for 
up to a year if it decides that a Community initiative should be 
undertaken. The assumption behind this initiative is that regulatory 
diversity in Europe can be accepted provided it does not trigger new 
barriers to intra-Community trade. 
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5 Blocks to trans border business activity-
Europe's no place like home 
A real home market is not just a place where companies trade without 
hindrance, but also one where they can operate in a cohesive regulatory 
environment. It is a market where the laws controlling firms and the 
incentives encouraging their activity are not so out of line as to make 
its unity a polite diplomatic fiction rather than hard economic fact -
one where the rules of the game, if not the same, are not so different 
as to add major costs to doing business on a Europe-wide basis. 
The costs facing companies linked across national boundaries 
within the EC, the subject of the report on transborder business 
activity, provide plenty of evidence of this type of obstacle facing 
European transnational firms. The report was based on an extensive 
survey of companies in France, Germany, Italy and the UK, with 
subsidiaries or parents in most EC countries. The obstacles 
highlighted by company executives interviewed included differing 
tax and accounting standards, divergent product norms and social 
security laws. These problems were analysed exclusively from the 
standpoint of the costs that transborder links like joint ventures or 
subsidiaries incurred as a result. 
Costs of regulatory diversity estimated in billions 
The research estimates that the charge of Europe's regulatory 
diversity on existing transborder operations, while difficult to 
quantify in detail, runs into tens of billions of Ecu. These costs are 
further compounded by the innumerable cases of Europe-wide 
business rationalization which are not even attempted because of the 
costs involved. The sectors surveyed in interviews with companies 
were in the main automobiles, machinery, textiles, telecoms and 
pharmaceuticals. The last two appear to suffer most from the cost of 
inefficiencies induced by regulatory obstacles. Automobiles is 
another industry for which non-Europe is a major cost factor. 
Inter-company link-ups and corporate expansion are an expensive 
business, of course, even in a home market. Costs are front-loaded 
and benefits are, by and large, for the longer-term. But to the 
deadweight costs inherent in any business cooperation are added, at 
the European level, a regulatory diversity so complex that, with 
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limited exceptions, only larger companies can manage the more 
integrated forms of cross-frontier links. Thus transborder operations 
involving smaller companies are normally limited to marketing. 
Otherwise smaller business is in the main excluded from the 
European game. Costs make many of the more ambitious forms of 
cooperation almost the chasse gardee of big businesses. And even they 
pay for it. Among others, in the five following ways: 
1 Accounting costs and 'fiscal suspicion' 
The extra administrative burden imposed by different auditing and 
fiscal systems was estimated by the report at between 10%-30% of 
the costs of the company departments involved. 
High on the list of problems faced by integrated European 
multinationals are differing accounting standards. These lead to the 
considerable administrative costs of standardizing the accounts (or 
'translating' them) for the purposes of central management control. 
Indeed, most large companies have to produce three sets of figures: 
those conforming to the national requirements of the parent 
company (including the consolidated or 'translated' accounts 
of subsidiaries); national accounts for each subsidiary; and a 
standardized system specific to the company used by all of its units 
for the purposes of internal control. Add to this the different 
reporting dates and periods in different EC countries, and the effort 
required to avoid total confusion, let alone manage the company, can 
easily be imagined. 
For all that, the tax problem is much more serious. Europe-wide 
companies are forced systematically to make costly adjustments to 
allay what is termed the 'fiscal suspicion' of competing national tax 
authorities. Such suspicion tends to view the daily exchange of 
goods, assets and know-how between affiliated companies located in 
different countries almost exclusively as an opportunity for tax 
evasion. This assumption on the part of the national tax collector, 
whether or not justified, in turn generates considerable administrative 
costs for companies - to say nothing of the limits that it imposes on 
company flexibility. That's to say, the freedom of the company to act 
as a single operation and not simply an aggregation of nationally 
distinct units. 
These 'beggar-thy-neighbour' attempts made by national tax 
authorities to maximise their share of a European company's tax 
liability have grave consequences. In addition to their extravagant 
demands on corporate administration, they influence other key 
company decisions, including those on locating group management, 
production and R&D. 
For example, the suspicion that transfer prices are being used to 
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export profits from one tax jurisdiction to another makes it often 
difficult, according to the companies interviewed, for central R&D 
expenditure to be actually charged to subsidiaries. Indeed, they 
claimed that it was in fact easier for an independent firm to export 
items like software at its fair value than for affiliated companies to do 
so between themselves. There are more general problems too. Many 
companies cited the impossibility of reducing tax liability by off-
setting losses in one branch with profits in another as very costly to 
their operations. 
Transfer pricing policies practised in EC countries are, moreover, 
inconsistent - so inconsistent that, according to one respondent, a 
company had to be in an illegal situation somewhere. In fact 'Europe 
would grind to a halt if national legislation were fully applied'. 
2 Discriminatory impact of national industrial policies 
The discretionary application of national policy and regulations in 
areas like procurement, investment and R&D is a further cost billed 
to transborder operations. 
The picture is varied, depending on the country. A country like 
Italy, for example, which is seeking to build up from scratch a 
national strategic potential in the telecom sector, may practise 
outright discrimination against foreign-owned subsidiaries. National 
R&D programmes, as in the case of consumer electronics in 
Germany, may be discontinued altogether if a whole sector passes 
into foreign hands. Authorities in countries with inward investment 
controls, like Spain, may link the take-over of attractive companies 
by foreign capital to the buying out of a national lame duck. 
Local content is a common performance requirement for foreign 
investors seeking national procurement awards. Extreme examples of 
this are provided by the pharmaceutical sector. Companies surveyed 
in the research, for instance, claim that in Belgium the authorities 
'rewarded' local production with higher prices. In Britain, it was 
suggested (by non-British companies), price controls are related to 
total investment, including R&D. This led European companies to 
'overinvest' in British R&D activities: with 4% of the world 
pharmaceuticals market, the United Kingdom accounted for 10% of 
world research. 
3 Product specifications 
Divergent national product standards, in addition to their more 
general costs on the European economy (see Chapter 4), also have a 
specific impact on integrated business planning in Europe. A 
number of firms devote an excessive share of their R&D budgets to 
the adjustment of their technology to different national settings. 
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Apart from anything else, this practice obviously reduces the 
economies of scale for R&D which would otherwise accrue to 
integrated European companies in a truly integrated European 
market. Obstacles of this sort are particularly harsh in sectors like 
telecommunications and mass-produced electronic components. 
As a general rule, the problems encountered here mean substantial 
extra costs to European multinationals and often discourage them 
from increasing the level of internal integration. Paradoxically, for 
smaller business, the problems caused by differing product standards 
push them in a different direction and encourage them to seek 
production partners in other EC countries to adapt their product to 
local standards, get type-approval etc. 
4 Trade obstacles 
Border delays and uncertainties are causing increasing problems to 
the trade in components between the different entities of European 
transnational companies. Indeed the transborder activity of such 
firms, with their tight logistics planning, is hampered by border 
controls even more than arms-length trade (for latter see Chapter 2). 
A further problem is the intra-EC applications of strategic export 
controls drawn up by COCOM (the Coordinating Committee of 
NATO countries plus Japan controlling strategic exports). The 
COCOM controls mean hold-ups at the border, difficulties in 
carrying out speedy repairs (because spare-parts may be on the 
COCOM lists), not to speak of differences between national 
COCOM lists which cause uneven application and further problems 
at intra-EC frontiers. The problem of export controls was mentioned 
repeatedly by firms in the electronics and advanced engineering 
sectors, maybe indicating an area of future EC action in foreign trade 
policy. 
5 Employment regulation 
The social costs involved in the transfer of managerial and technical 
personnel between affiliated companies is a further problem for 
transborder business in the EC. The degree of 'portability' of social 
security benefits, notably pension schemes, is limited because they 
are tailored to national tax systems and/or related to public insurance 
schemes. In practice the firm must pay twice, raising salary costs for 
expatriates by 10%-15%. 
Differing impact on different sectors 
The aggregate costs borne by transborder business link-ups, as a 
result of inefficiencies caused by these regulatory burdens, are not 
spread evenly between sectors. Sectors combining high levels of both 
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technology and regulation emerge as worst off. Mature industries 
like automobiles and consumer electronics fare somewhat better but 
their integrated European structures are nonetheless severely 
penalised. Industries where performance can be optimized at lower 
levels of transborder integration come off best. (The cost of the 
sector-specific barriers affecting industries considered here are in 
most cases outlined in detail in Chapter 7, but Chapter 7 takes no 
account of non-specific regulatory burdens like divergent accounting, 
company law and tax requirements.) 
Pharmaceuticals and telecommunications 
These are strongly regulated and protected industries with a high 
incidence of almost all of the obstacles cited above. Particularly 
costly are the problems associated in overcoming barriers posed by 
national industrial policies and technical standards. 
Automobiles 
The problems cited by this group include national industrial 
protection, shortfalls in economies of scale due to differences in 
technical standards, and substantial administrative costs for highly 
integrated operations. Total costs linked to transborder activity were 
estimated at higher than both average profit margins and average 
R&D expenditure of firms in these sectors. 
Textiles and machine tools 
Companies in these two groups were characterized by high 
specialization, with fairly decentralized manufacturing units each 
producing independent parts of the product range. Subsidiaries were 
typically involved in marketing or service functions. There were few 
problems with technical standards. Transborder costs for companies 
in these sectors were much lower than for telecoms, pharmaceuticals 
and automobiles. 
Serious as this overall situation appears, it is not the full picture. 
There would be further savings which would occur if regulatory 
obstacles were eliminated or significantly reduced. For in a real 
European home market, the pattern of business competition and 
thus of business structures may be expected to change substantially. 
True, transborder business links may in some cases be reduced if, 
for example, national performance requirements (like local content) 
imposed on certain industrial sectors lessen. But the positive impact 
of the removal of obstacles would be much greater. The prospect is 
that it would unleash a growth of trans-European business link-ups 
which are being foregone by companies not big enough to bear the 
costs. 
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It is clear that it is for this latter category of companies, currently 
excluded from playing the transborder business game, that the 
potential is the most exciting. Under true home market conditions, 
they may be expected to become involved in the new forms of 
transborder organization, like cooperative networking, with which 
industry is now experimenting. Cooperative networking, which can 
exist with minority equity participation or indeed even in its 
absence, provides a form of business link-up which meets companies' 
needs for both strategic control and flexibility. The latter in 
particular is of increasing importance, since it allows firms to provide 
the efficient short-term market responsiveness which is becoming the 
essence of modern business organization. 
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6 The costs for the service sectors 
The service sectors play a role of growing importance in the 
European economy. But their potential for much more significant 
growth is being artificially pinned back by regulations and practices 
which significantly inhibit the free flow of services and thus the free 
play of competition between companies supplying them. Moreover, 
because of the role they play in servicing business as a whole, the 
stunted growth they suffer is passed on into the economy at large. 
Governmtnt regulations, while aiming primarily at prudential or 
safety objectives, often constitute a barrier to market entry to many 
of the sectors considered below. This is the case, for instance, for 
many activities in financial services (banking, insurance and 
securities), while the role of technical regulations, standards and 
procurement impact heavily on the Community market, or the 
absence of it, for telecommunications services. The regulatory 
situation is more varied for other business services - eg. advertising, 
engineering, computing and legal services. 
Financial Services 
Overview 
Substantial economic gains may be expected from real integration of 
European financial services markets. This is because of the unique, 
pivotal role played by financial services in catalysing the economy as 
a whole. Removal of barriers here, and of the costs linked to them, 
would lead to three interlocking effects : a surge in the competitivity 
of the sector itself; a knock-on boost to all business using its 
increasingly efficient services; and, more generally, a new 'and 
positive influence on the conduct of macro-economic policy in the 
EC. 13 
An order of magnitude of Ecu 22 billion, based on calculations 
and assumptions detailed in the report, is the estimate for the gains 
forecast by the research for the eight EC countries studied as a result 
of integration of the three main areas of financial service activity: 
banking and credit, insurance, brokerage and securities. Core 
element of this calculation was the analysis of the present price 
differentials between the eight markets - France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, the UK and the Benelux countries - for a representative 
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Table 6.1 Percentage differences in prices of standard financial products compared with the average of the four lowest national 
prices* 
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Banking services 
1. Consumer credit Annual cost of consumer loan of -41 136 39 n.a. 121 -26 31 121 
500 ECU. Excess interest rate 
over money market rates 
2. Credit cards Annual cost assuming 500 ECU 79 60 26 -30 89 -12 43 16 
debit. Excess interest rate over 
money market rates 
3. Mortgages Annual cost of home loan of 31 57 118 78 -4 n.a. -6 -20 
25,000 ECU. Excess interest rate 
over money market rates 
4. Letters of credit Cost of letter of credit of 50,000 22 -10 59 -7 9 27 17 8 
ECU for three months 
5. Foreign exchange drafts Cost to a large commercial client 6 31 196 56 23 33 -46 16 
of purchasing a commercial draft 
for 30,000 ECU. 
6. Travellers cheques Cost for a private consumer of 35 -7 30 39 22 -7 33 -7 
purchasing 100 ECU worth of 
travellers cheques 
7. Commercial loans Annual cost (including -5 6 19 -7 9 6 43 46 
commissions and charges) to a 
medium sized firm of a 
commercial loan of 250,000 ECU 
Insurance services 
1. Life insurance Average annual cost of term (life) 78 5 37 33 83 66 -9 -30 
insurance 
2. Home insurance Annual cost of fire and theft cover -16 3 -4 39 81 57 17 90 
for house valued at 70,000 ECU 
with 28,000 ECU contents 
3. Motor insurance Annual cost of comprehensive 30 15 100 9 148 77 -7 -17 
insurance, 1.6 litre car, driver 10 
years experience, no claims bonus 
4. Commercial fire and theft Annual cover for premises valued -9 43 24 153 245 -15 -1 27 
at 387,240 ECU & stock at 
232,344 ECU 
5. Public liability cover Annual premium for engineering 13 47 60 117 77 9 -16 -7 
company with 20 employees and 
annual turnover of 1.29 million 
ECU 
Brokerage services 
1. Private equity transactions Commission costs of cash bargain 36 7 65 -13 -3 7 114 123 
of 1440 ECU 
2. Private gilts transaction Commision costs of cash bargain 14 90 217 21 -63 27 161 36 
of 14000 ECU 
3. Institutional equity Commission cots of cash bargain 26 69 153 -5 47 68 26 -47 
transactions of 288000 ECU 
4. Institutional gilt Commission costs of cash bargain 284 -4 60 57 92 -36 21 n.a. 
transactions of 7.2 million ECU 
* The figures show the extent to which financial product prices, in each country, are above a low reference level. Each of these 
price differences implies a theoretical potential price fall from existing price levels to the low reference level (see also Table 6.2, 
p.42). 
basket of financial services (consumer credit, mortgage, etc), and of 
their price development under the competitive pressures of integration. 
Examples of existing price differences abound (see Table 6.1), 
reflecting differing competitive conditions in EC member states. 
Divergences are frequently of the order of SO% or more. Notably 
wide margins are found in prices charged for motor insurance, home 
loans, consumer credit and securities. 
A few figures illustrate the present size of the Community's 
financial services sector, and its pervasive influence over the 
economy as a whole. Value-added by the credit and insurance sectors 
alone accounted for some 6.5% of the EC's gross domestic product in 
1985. This was generated by 3% of the EC workforce whose share in 
overall compensation, however, was 6%, indicating earnings of 
around twice the Community average. In the eight countries studied, 
insurance premiums were estimated at around 5% of Gdp, while 
bank loans and stock market capitalization were respectively 142% 
and 116% of Gdp. 
Substantial barriers beginning to be eroded by EC action 
A variety of barriers, legislative and other, continue to hinder 
integration in banking, insurance and securities. High on the list of 
these obstacles is one with a multi-sectoral impact on financial 
services: controls on capital movements. 
Despite progress toward the removal of this constraint, strict 
controls are still applied in four EC countries (Spain, Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland), and France and Italy are only now in the 
process of liberalizing them. Exchange controls have been removed 
in the UK and Denmark, and Germany and the Benelux countries 
allow free capital movement subject, however, to reporting and 
authorization procedures on certain transactions. The Commission 
has proposed a two-phase plan for fully integrating EC capital 
markets by 1992, and the first of these phases, which took effect 
February 1987, liberalizes cross-border transactions in unlisted 
securities, unit trusts, national securities on foreign stock markets 
and longer-term trade credits. 
Banks Beyond exchange controls lies a variety of other obstacles 
affecting financial services. Thus in the banking sector, although 
freedom of establishment has been achieved through EC legislation 
and little overt discrimination remains, it appears difficult for many 
banks to compete successfully in other Community countries because 
new establishment involves considerable costs not borne by existing 
domestic banking networks. These difficulties are aggravated in 
certain countries (eg. Spain, Italy) by restrictions on foreign 
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acqulSltiOns or part1c1pations in local banks. Moreover, even after 
removal of exchange controls, selling banking services across internal 
EC borders would be hampered in certain Community countries by 
some residual banking regulations (eg. preventing cross-border 
soliciting of deposits, and rules in some member states against bank 
involvement in the securities' business). An EC proposal (for a 
'second Council directive on credit institutions'), made in January 
1988 and targetted for adoption by 1989, should ensure that such 
legislative barriers are swept away by 1992. 
Insurance As in the banking sector, there is freedom to establish 
(despite major residual differences in national regulations), but 
restrictions on doing direct cross-frontier business remain significant. 
Indeed, most member states (eg. Germany) simply do not permit 
non-national insurers to solicit directly without a local permanent 
establishment and this, coupled with discriminatory tax measures, 
continues to insulate many national insurers from outside competition. 
However, a significant step towards increased competltlon, 
particularly for larger commercial risk cover, was taken in February 
1988 when the EC Council reached agreement on a proposed 
directive whose formal adoption is expected before year-end. 
Stock market and securities Apart from residual exchange controls 
(clearly a significant barrier in this sector), integration is trammelled 
by a variety of national regulations. These include rules preventing 
foreigners being licensed as brokers, imposition in some countries of 
discriminatory taxes on purchases of foreign securities, and re-
strictions on balance sheet holdings of foreign securities. Once again 
a number of EC directives have been adopted in this area, and others 
- eg. the directive, effective as of 1989, enabling unit trusts to market 
Community-wide - should continue the impetus to liberalization. 
Gains from removal of barriers 
The Ecu 22 billion gain from completing the EC internal market was 
calculated on the basis of estimates of the prices of a standard set of 
financial products before and after the removal of regulatory 
barriers, including abolition of exchange controls. 
Table 6.1 (see above) lists the services investigated and the price 
differences prevailing for them between the eight countries studied. 
For each of these products, current prices were estimated which, 
when coverted into Ecus, enable intra-country comparisons. 
Using this comparative analysis as a starting point, the research 
analysed the potential price falls and, within this overall potential, the 
expected price falls subsequent to the removal of regulatory barriers. 
The outcome of this calculation is given in Table 6.2 over. 
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Table 6.2 Potential and expected price falls for financial services 
Potential price Range of Mid points of the 
falls (%) expected expected range of 
price falls price falls (% )* 
1. Spain 34 16- 26 21 
2. Italy 28 9- 19 14 
3. France 24 7- 17 12 
4. Belgium 23 6- 16 11 
5. Germany 25 5- 15 10 
6. Luxemburg 17 3- 13 8 
7. UK 13 2- 12 7 
8. Netherlands 9 0- 9 4 
* Ranges of 10 percentage points wide have been assumed, with the above expected 
price falls as the mid points. 
This shows the greatest expected fall in Spain, somewhat smaller 
falls in Italy, France, Belgium and Germany, and the most modest 
reductions in the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and the Nether-
lands. The difference between potential and expected price falls 
reflects the fact that, even after removing regulatory obstacles, 
differences in financial markets would subsist due to unavoidable 
variations in risk, custom and other local conditions. 
Broken down between the eight countries studied, the share per 
country in this expected gain for financial service consumers is given 
below in Table 6.3. The largest overall benefits are registered by the 
United Kingdom and Germany where price falls, though relatively 
modest, are leveraged upwards by the size of their financial services 
markets. 
Table 6.3 Estimated gain in consumer surplus resulting from integration of 
European credit and insurance markets 
ECU s billion 
Belgium 0.7 
Germany 4.6 
Spain 3.2 
France 3.7 
Italy 4.0 
Luxemburg 0.1 
Netherlands 0.3 
United Kingdom 5.1 
Total 21.7 
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Telecommunications services 
Overview 
Rapid communication of information is an essential both for 
integrating Europe's markets and for the modernization and 
competitivity of the companies operating in it. Telecom services -
starting with the phone but ranging through 'value-added services' 
like telex, fax and vision (now able to be carried together on an 
integrated network) - are the vehicle for meeting these needs. The 
importance of providing the telecom sector with a regulatory 
framework suited to meeting these demands was recognized in 1987 
by the EC Commission's 'Green Paper on the Development of the 
Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment'. 
With the arrival of new digital signalling and switching systems, 
telecoms are increasingly converging with the digital technology of 
the data-processing sector, a convergence epitomized by ISDN 
('integrated services digital network'). As a result digital telecoms do 
for computers what the motorway network did for the automobile. 
They provide the so-called 'global information highway' - not just 
for the computer industry but for all sectors relying on accurate data 
and its speedy transmission to stay competitive. 
The trouble with the EC's emerging information highway is its 
many national road blocks - and even the problems of the 
incompatible equipment being used in the construction of its various 
sections. Illustrated below, these barriers take a variety of forms -
including divergent norms, generally high tariffs for network users, 
and the overweening presence of monopoly service suppliers (the 
Community's PTTs) essentially dictating in their different national 
enclaves the rules according to which the highway is accessed and 
used. 
Community's PTT revenue from the telecom service sector 
totalled some Ecu 61 billion in 1985 (see Table 6.4), or around four 
times the EC telecom equipment market (see Chapter 7). By 
comparison, the US market for services is twice the size of the EC 
sector. In the Community, voice telephony accounts for 85% - 90% 
of total PTT telecom revenues, with up to 10% deriving from fax 
and up to 5% from telex. 
Barriers 
The various obstacles hampering market integration and economic 
performance - differing standards, the monopoly powers of the 
PTTs etc. - impact on business in all sectors, not to speak of the 
private individual. 
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Table 6.4 National income from telecoms service provision (1985) 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Italy 
Ireland 
Luxemburg 
Netherlands 
Ponugal (CCT and CL T) 
Spain 
UK (BT only) 
Total 
Source: Telefonica/ITU (Exchange rates as of 1985) 
Operating Income 
in mill. ECU 
1,406 
1,076 
13,428 
15,124 
721 
8,351 
624 
82 
2,539 
679 
3,154 
14,245 
61,429 
Monopoly powers have fathered artificial price levels. Thus the 
tariffs set for long-distance international calls by PTTs are 
disproportionately greater than those for national long-distance 
connections. This is a fairly direct method of penalizing cross-
frontier communication, be it for commercial or personal purposes. 
Tariffs vary, sometimes significantly, between different EC 
countries. For certain sectors of business, this can lead to distortions 
in decisions on company location. The attraction of low telephone 
tariffs may, for example, determine where the host computers of 
data banks are located. Provision of telebanking services may, in 
turn, tend to be concentrated in financial markets with access to 
cost-effective telecom services. 
Widespread limitations exist on the use of leased lines. Thus firms 
leasing lines from the PTT may be restricted in the use they can 
make of them as a vehicle for carrying cross-border telecom services 
for their clients. This acts as a double brake: first on business 
activity, and second, on the development of the value-added telecom 
services increasingly required for effective business performance. 
Market fragmentation for services partly results from the knock-
on effect of similar segmentation suffered by the telecom equipment 
sector (see Chapter 7). Exercise of monopoly powers, notably over 
national standards and procurement, has tended to result in 
overpriced and incompatible equipment, meaning in some cases that 
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services are simply not available in certain national markets. Market 
entry barriers like this are on occasion justified on the grounds that 
foreign equipment might harm the local system. 
Symptomatic of these obstacles are differences in videotex 
systems. The UK, France and Germany have developed their 
systems without coordination, and only now are attempts being 
made to rectify the situation. The problem facing Iveco, a FIAT 
affiliate, is a case in point. In France, a client can use the local 
videotex to select the model he wants, but German and Italian clients 
cannot yet plug in. 
Market entry barriers can be more forthright. The national 
monopolies can simply prevent private companies from providing 
client-specific services. Private value-added networks for data 
transmission are not allowed to compete with the national monopoly 
in many EC countries. A new company planning to offer such 
services in France - to be formed by IBM and some French 
companies- would have been in violation of French law. 14 
To tackle these and other obstacles, the EC's Green Paper on 
telecoms has adopted a selective approach to the problem of national 
regulation and the barriers that can arise as a result. It suggests that 
for basic telecom networks, especially voice telephony, national 
administrations should maintain their traditional role. However, the 
Green Paper draws a line between 'reserved services' of this sort and 
'competitive services', ie. the value-added services (VAS) for which 
open competition is recommended. Measures to enhance inter-
operability are also proposed, as is a European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute. 
Costs 
Companies and individuals have to bear heavy burdens resulting 
from market and trade barriers. These are casted in Table 6.5, 
whose two right-hand columns provide estimates of gains following 
removal of these costs, for respectively two different levels of 
liberalization. 
The first of these, taking as its point of departure implementation 
of the minimum liberalization requirements spelt out in the Green 
Paper, indicates that these gains could amount to around Ecu 2 
billion. The important components of this overall figure are the 
benefits, including economies of scale, resulting for the service 
network as a result of lower equipment costs leading to lower tariffs; 
and those stemming from greater competition for non-reserved 
services. 
Full network competition, the subject of the right-hand column, 
would mean additional gains. The principal quantifiable benefit in 
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Table 6.5 Economic costs of barriers m telecoms services- the potential benefits 
to be expected from EC regulatory reforms 
Measures 
1) Lower equipment costs 
(see Chapter 7) lead to 
lower tariffs and thereby 
economies of scale and 
fill in the network use 
2) More competitive 'Non-
Reserved Services' 
a) easier CPE certifica-
tion, increased product 
variety, lower CPE 
prices, larger network 
use 
b) liberalize VAS 
c) open network pro-
vision 
Minimum 
Green Paper Effect 
0.75 billion ECU per annum 
savings2 
0.5--0.7 billion ECU savings 
0.3-0.4 billion ECU savings 
by 1990 
0.2 billion ECU savings by 
1990 
3) Tariff Reforms (closer to not estimated 
cost) 
for long-distance and international traffic 
'Full Network 
Competition' Effect1 
slightly larger 
not estimated 
larger, because few 
network restrictions 
not estimated 
4 billion ECU p.a. 
2 these gains exclude the direct savings on equipment purchases. 
this scenario would be an Ecu 4 billion annual benefit from a 
lowering of tariffs for long-distance and international traffic. 
Other business services 
Outline 
First impressions, gained from users of business services, are that 
there are no great barriers to cross-frontier activity in areas like 
advertising, public relations, engineering and legal services. But 
these impressions, reflecting a generally low level of awareness of 
obstacles among service users, are misleading. This is one of the 
chief conclusions emerging from research into the costs borne by 
business services as a result of European market fragmentation, and 
into the economic benefits which may be expected to accrue from 
their removal. The research, including a survey of users and 
provider:s of such services in France, Germany, Italy, the United 
Kingdom and the Benelux countries, comes up with an assessment 
of the overall EC turnover of the sector in 1986 broken down by sub-
sector (see Table 6.6). 
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Table 6.6 Business services turnover, 1986 (total EC)* 
Sector 
Engineering & Related Services 
Consultancy 
Advertising** 
Public Relations 
Computing Services 
Research & Development 
Financial Review (accounting, audit) 
Legal Services 
Total 
* Excluding operational services (eg. catering) 
** Including media costs 
Turnover 
(bn Ecu) 
7.5 
3.5 
57 
2 
13 
15 
13 
13 
124.0 
Taken as a whole, business services make an important contribution 
to the Community economy, with their value added accounting for 
around 4% of the EC's gross domestic product. 
Barriers and their impact 
Understandably, perhaps, suppliers of business services are much 
more aware than their customers of the hurdles to be crossed in 
delivering cross-frontier client service. These include, with varying 
impact depending on the sector: tax and financial barriers, 
restrictions on carrying out business abroad, differing product 
regulations and illiberal public procurement. The types of barriers 
affecting the various sectors, together with an indication of their 
overall significance, are evaluated (see Table 6.7). 
Illustrative of the problems created by these barriers is the 
complaint from a UK computer services company about differences 
in standards. More generally, in sectors like advertising and public 
relations, there are sharp differences between EC countries in the 
conditions for doing business, often with important knock-on effects 
on competition. Thus in Germany, advertising and PR firms are 
barred from raising money through public share issues, leaving them 
vulnerable to competition from UK companies with unrestricted 
access to stock markets. Using this facility, Saatchi & Saatchi is now 
not only Europe's no. 1, but the world's leading advertising/PR 
group. Still in the advertising sector, an obstacle the survey shows as 
significant is constituted by conflicting regulations on TV advertising 
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Table 6.7 Barriers to trade in business services 
Sector Nature of barriers Overall significance of 
barrier 
Engineering and related Government procurement i) Engineers: 
Technical standards 
barriers quite 
significant 
Licensing of professionals ii) Architect: 
barriers very 
Tax treatment restrictive 
Computing services Government and PTI UK reports this barrier 
procurement of computer 
services 
Research and Bias in government Reported by Germany 
development procurement (demand side interview) 
Commercial Satellite broadcasting 
communications barriers 
Differences in advertising 
law (regarding 
permissible advertising 
material) 
Limitations on media time Generally regarded as 
for advertising reasonably free market 
Lack of access to equity 
markets (Germany) 
Qualifications of 
professionals 
Legal services Freedom to practice Not generally recognized by 
professional bodies as 
significant 
Operational services None Largely unregulated market 
Management None No barriers of significance 
consultancy 
whose impact is increasing. To resolve these problems the 
Commission has proposed a measure harmonizing national rules on 
advertising on public TV programmes. 
Four main benefits resulting from removal of barrier-related costs 
These barriers lead to costs both for providers and users of services 
whose removal, according to the research, could over time lead to 
global savings of up to Ecu 9.2 billion. 
First, they increase the costs for companies seeking to market 
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their services abroad, they hinder expansion and reduce the quality 
and range of services available. Service suppliers expect that 
increased competition resultant on completion of the internal market 
will lead to consumers gaining in quality perhaps even more than in 
lower prices. Competitors are not likely to enter new markets on a 
price-cutting basis but rather by offering improved products. 
Nevertheless, costs to service companies could be reduced by up to 
Ecu 3.5 billion. 
Second, a knock-on effect of this is the costs for all sectors 
currently using business services - taking the form of lower output 
than would be the case in an integrated market. Improved business 
services should lead to increases in the competitivity of the 
companies buying in these services in relation to their rivals outside 
the Community, in addition to creating more even competitive 
conditions within the EC. This factor is expected to boost sales of 
service user companies by up to an estimated Ecu 3 billion. 
Third, over and above cost savings for business service suppliers 
noted above, there should be further gains for them as their output 
rises in response to the extra demand created by the completion of 
the internal market in all sectors. Increased demand for services 
from this source is estimated in a spread of Ecu 0. 7-2.5 billion. 
Also linked to the impulse given to demand by general market 
integration is another gain distinguished by the research under the 
name 'externalization'. This is that companies actually or potentially 
using business services will tend increasingly to buy in services from 
outside, rather than attempt to provide them themselves from 
within. Under the pressure of intensified competition, user companies 
will be forced to concentrate on those areas of their activities that 
they are best at. For these companies, cost savings in externalizing 
services might be of the order of Ecu 100--ZOOm. Externalization will 
also have a favourable employment effect in the service-providing 
companies. 
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7 Costs in the manufacturing sector 
How does the array of barriers signalled in the preceding pages 
impact on individual industrial activities in the EC? What, from this 
more specific perspective, are the costs they impose - be they the 
costs directly linked to barriers, or those which reflect more general 
benefits foregone because of the existence of barriers? 
A widespread finding of the six short industry case studies 
outlined below is that, as in the service sectors (Chapter 6), the size 
of the longer-term gains to be had from EC market integration is 
much greater than the costs directly saved by removing barriers. 
The sectors examined below (telecoms, motor manufacturing, 
foodstuffs, building products, textiles and clothing, and pharmaceu-
ticals) together represent 43% of the Community's industrial output 
and provide 13% of the economy's total value added. They were 
selected to give as broad a picture as possible of the range of 
problems manufacturing companies can face as a result of market 
barriers. Understandably, the picture shows that barriers vary in 
impact depending on the basic characteristics of the sector 
concerned. 
Nonetheless, one general point emerges clearly. This is the 
pervasive impact of standards and technical regulations in most of 
the industries considered. By contrast, the procurement barrier 
tends to pose particular problems in areas like telecommunications 
and pharmaceuticals, but is relatively minor for some of the other 
branches considered below. 
Telecommunications equipment 
Overview 
The costs imposed on the EC telecommunications equipment 
industry by national regulation and practice are substantial, as is 
their ripple effect throughout the economy. They are getting greater 
as business everywhere, under the twin pressures of rapid technological 
changes and the size of the market share required to amortize their 
development, is being forced to go global. 
In varying degrees, these factors apply to the three main sub-
sectors of the Community's telecom equipment industry, namely : 
so 
• customer premises equipment (CPE) - terminal equipment like 
telephones, telefax and telex machines (CPE took a 24% share of 
the EC's telecom equipment market in 1986); 
• transmission equipment - wires, cables, antennas etc. needed to 
transmit voice, data and vision (13% of EC market); 
• central office equipment (CO) - switching equipment needed to 
connect the various transmission paths (with 47% of the market, 
CO is easily the largest segment). 
Overall costs are estimated by the research to be as much as some 
25% of the $17.5 billion estimated value of the total telecom 
equipment Community market in 1986. The main item in this bill is 
restrictive procurement practices, followed by divergences in 
national standards and restrictive certification policies. 
Measures, set out in the EC Commission's 1985 Internal Market 
White Paper and its 1987 Green Paper on Telecommunications (see 
diagram below), seek to limit the costs imposed by national 
behaviour in these areas. Even though total removal of costs -
implying a fully competitive market - may be an ambitious expecta-
tion, considerable benefits are in prospect including, according to the 
report, significant gains from economies of scale. 
EC Telecom Green Paper* 
Among the actions it envisages: 
• phased 40% liberalization of public procurement, post-1992 
a directive for 100% opening; 
• creation of a European Standards Institute to accelerate 
standards and technical specifications, and ease certification; 
• clear separation of regulatory and market functions of 
telecom authorities. 
* 'Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market 
for Telecommunications Services and Equipment'. 
Improvements in EC industry and market organization are needed 
urgently. In 1986, the Community represented about 19% of the 
world market as against 38% for the US and 9% for Japan. 
Moreover, the EC market is forecast to grow up to 1990 at around 
half the rate for the U~ (6.6%) and Japan (5%). Even the larger EC 
member states have small markets- compared to Japan, let alone the 
US- and these are segmented, there being little intra-EC trade. Not 
surprisingly, European industry's competitivity is declining. The EC 
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sector's surplus, which shrank from Ecu 1.5 billion in 1984 to Ecu 
1.2 billion in 1986, is mainly obtained from trade with smaller 
countries; by contrast it ran a deficit with the US and Japan of 
respectively Ecu 620m and 685m in 1986. 
Barriers reinforced by market power of regulatory authorities 
Differing standards, restrictive certification and protectionist public 
purchasing are the main barriers which segment the Community 
market into national entities and sustain the symbiotic relationship, 
within most member states, between the industry and the national 
PTTs (posts, telephone and telecommunications authorities). Despite 
signs of incipient liberalization ( eg. the privatization of British 
Telecom), this relationship remains the key fact of life in the EC 
telecom equipment business. 
National telecom authorities have a crucial dual role. They set the 
rules of the game and, as regards purchasing for most equipment, 
are its major players. Easily the greatest buyers of telecom 
equipment - achieving shares of 80% in some countries - these 
bodies often use their purchasing muscle to support national 
producers and sometimes deliberately to exclude external competitors. 
One result of this is artificially high prices. At the beginning of the 
decade, equipment in Europe was 80%-100% more expensive than in 
the US. Moreover, there are important price differences within the 
Community (see Table 7.1) 
Equally impressive, in its own way, is the performance of the 
national authorities as industry regulators. The barriers to market 
entry they create by protectionist national procurement have 
Table 7.1 High EC prices for telecom equipment- Overpricing in EC 
markets compared wuh competitive world levels15 
% price deviation 
Country Central Office Transmission Consumer Premises 
Belgium 120 60 40 
Denmark 30 30 40 
France so 30 40 
Germany 100 so 80 
Greece n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Italy 100 30 40 
Ireland n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Luxemburg n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Netherlands so n.a. 60 
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Spain so 40 30 
United Kingdom 40 30 40 
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traditionally been supplement~d by their further control over 
product standardization and certification. This has led to incompatible 
standards and 'input specificity' - meaning that new equipment must 
be compatible with existing installations, thus discouraging new 
entrants to the market. 
Barriers also impact on equipment sold directly to private 
customers. A driver wishing to use a car telephone on a trip from 
Germany via Belgium to the UK has to install three different 
systems. A telefax machine installed in France has to fulfil somewhat 
different certification requirements from those required, for example, 
in Denmark or Greece. For private automatic branch exchanges 
(PABX), the divergences in costs and procedures are evident from 
the following table. 
Table 7.2 Type approval procedures: fees and delays 
Country 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Fee charged 
12,500-56,000 BF 
n.a. 
varies according to 
testing costs incurred 
varies according to 
testing costs incurred 
£10 000 modems 
up to £100 000 PABXs 
No charge 
Average delay 
3-6 months 
I year 
6 months-! year 
6 months-! year 
If no modification 
necessary: 3 months 
Less than 10 weeks 
Source: Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung,. Study prepared for the 
Commission of the EC, 1986 
Costs and economies of scale 
The costs inherent in the market fragmentation caused by these 
barriers are estimated by the research in a range of around Ecu 3-
4.8 billion. The calculation is made on the basis of the difference 
between, on the one hand, the performance expected from industry 
in the competitive environment sought by EC proposals and, on the 
other, the forward projection of the present situation unaided by 
Community action. 
Table 7.3 examines the gains to be achieved from the removal of 
the two basic cost areas - standards and procurement. These gains 
reflect both static gains (ie. those brought about by the downward 
matching of prices directly following the removal of barriers), and 
dynamic gains (those achieved over the longer run, eg. sales growth, 
economies of scale, etc. resulting on market integration). In the case 
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of public procurement, the effects of two alternative degrees of 
liberalization have been calculated: 40% and 100% (see also diagram 
on Telecom Green Paper p.Sl). 
In general, economies of scale are imperative if European industry 
is to absorb the costs of developing the new generation of digital 
switching equipment. Losses from unrealized economies of scale are 
greatest for central office equipment (CO) where software costs are 
currently estimated at above SO% of value added. 
Despite the manufacturing scale required by digitalization, the EC 
market is segmented into relatively small national entities in which 
typically several firms, often indigenous, are competing to supply 
only one national buyer. According to the report, savings of Ecu 
1.25-1.5 billion would be gained by companies in the public 
switching sector as a result of rationalized standards and partially 
liberalized (40%) procurement. Assuming total procurement liberal-
ization, a further gain of Ecu 1.3 billion would be realized. 
The estimate is that the potential gains from economies of scale for 
the other market segments, including CPE and transmission 
equipment, are not as high as for CO. However, they are significant 
and, as digitalization begins to make possible network integration 
(ISDN - integrated services digital networks), they are increasing. 
Table 7.3 Telecom eqwpment: gains from EC market mtegration (static and 
dynamic combined) - Ecu billions 
Product: 
Central 
Office 
Switching 
Transmission 
Terminal 
Equipment (CPE) 
Other 
Total 
Effects of 
standardization 
0.45-0.7 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.85-1.1 
* dynam1c effect spread throughout all sectors. 
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Effects of procurement 
liberalization 
40% 100% 
0.8 1.3 
0.4 0.5 
0.4 1.0 
0.4 0.9 
2.0 + 3.7 
0.2* 
Automobiles 
Overview 
Contributing almost 6% of value-added in EC manufacturing and 
employing 7% of its workforce, the automobile industry is by any 
standards a key sector of the European economy. In 1985, EC 
manufacturers accounted for about 40% of world passenger car 
output. Yet a range of barriers, including divergent technical 
regulations and massive tax differences, continue to fragment the 
Community market and impede the rational organization of a 
Europe-wide industry mpplying it. Overall cost of the impediments 
signalled in the White Paper, or the savings which would over time 
result from their removal, in particular through economies of scale, 
is estimated at Ecu 2.6 billion, or 5% of the industry's unit costs. 
These are the essential conclusions of the research report which 
was based, inter alia, on a detailed survey of auto manufacturers and 
suppliers. A particular focus of the report was how the post-1992 
integrated market would impact on two key phases of industry 
activity- design and engineering, and manufacturing and assembly. 
Clearing away the regulatory diversity enabling industry to gear up 
these functions for the challenge of the 1990s is given additional 
incentive by the Community's market potential. By 1987, the EC 
had already overtaken the US to become the world's largest single 
car market. 
A single market - but only in name 
The trouble is that the world's largest single car market is single only 
in name. The range of obstacles hindering its effective integration, 
and likewise the matching rationalization of supply, provide a 
quintessential roll-call of Common Market disunity. This list, for 
reasons of space, is outlined here in abridged form: 
fiscal barriers: 
• taxation levels on car sales different in virtually all EC countries, 
ranging from 12% in Luxembourg to some 200% in Denmark 
and Greece; 
• divergent policies on the refunding of VAT for company 
purchases of vehicles; 
• distortion of competitive conditions by excessive aid to 'national 
champion' companies (grants, loans, equity injections, debt 
write-offs); 
• use of fiscal incentives in some countries (Netherlands, Germany, 
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Luxembourg and Denmark) to encourage sales of vehicles built 
to differing emission and noise standards. 
physical barriers: 
• documentary and inspection requirements at intra-EC borders, 
with attendant delays resulting in loss of time and money in the 
shipping of components; 
• differences in communications standards beween EC member 
states which impede cooperation in vehicle development and 
production. 
technical barriers: 
• lack of single EC-wide type approval procedure, requiring costly 
and time-consuming duplication of cars and tests; 
• unique national vehicle equipment requirements, eg side repeater 
flasher lights in Italy, reclining driver's seat in West Germany, 
right-hand drive and dim-dip lighting in the UK, yellow 
headlamp bulbs in France, and unique rear reflectors in 
Germany. 
Outlook for cost savings 
Creating real European home market conditions by removing such 
regulatory barriers - a key example being the absence of full EC type 
approval (see also Chapter 4) - should accelerate current trends in 
industrial reorganization and technological change both in car and 
component manufacturing. 
However, the challenge is not just the removal of obstacles but, in 
addition, the circumstances which allow these barriers to lead to 
such great price differences. In this respect the situation is 
particularly aggravated when divergent national standards are 
compounded by distribution arrangements which tend to segment 
the market. 
Getting maximum gains from an integrated EC car market also 
depends on developments in other areas. Thus a fully-integrated 
telecoms sector (see above) and elimination of border red-tape 
(Chapter 2) would do much to facilitate the auto industry's 
component trade. 
For 90 auto components surveyed, the research found that the 
European supply industry is providing many of the major components 
at rates far under 500,000 sets per annum. Sizeable economies of 
scale could be achieved if this level were reached. Sub-optimal 
production arises partly because carmakers are awarding the supply 
of a single part or assembly to several suppliers, and partly because 
of too many car models. A key economy of scale for European motor 
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manufacturing would be the reduction in the number of car-
platforms needed. Platforms are vehicle floor-plan designs to which 
common components are attached in the areas of running gear, 
suspension, and steering, and which, through relatively little 
changes, can be used for different car models. Today 30 platforms 
are used in the EC for passenger volume cars produced by the six 
majors (VW, Volvo, Renault, Fiat, Ford and GM), but in the fully 
integrated market conditions sought for 1992 this could be reduced 
to 21 involving platform-sharing between several manufacturers. 
Market integration, with gains of this sort, will result in savings in 
unit costs of around 5%, according to the research, or just over Ecu 
2.6 billion for Community manufacturers taken together. This 
saving is forecast to be partly attributable to direct cost reductions as 
a result of abolishing EC barriers, but in particular to economies of 
scale resulting from platform reductions. 
Looked at through another prism, the overall Ecu 2.6 billion 
figure can be expressed in terms of savings in respectively variable 
and fixed costs. Dominating the variable cost savings of almost Ecu 
900m is an estimated gain of Ecu 826m in labour costs. This reflects 
a dramatic improvement in labour productivity, itself a result of the 
rationalized organization of output. Savings of Ecu 1. 7 billion in 
fixed costs are broken down as follows: 
Table 7.4 Savings in fixed costs in the automobile sector 
Savings in fixed costs 
• tooling 
• engineering 
• warranty provision 
• administration/finance 
• advertising 
Ecu million 
571.7 
700.7 
175.3 
213.3 
42.3 
To these gains must be added the potential increase in sales 
resulting from price reductions. It has been estimated that the EC's 
demand for cars might increase by around half a million units simply 
as a result of the drop in prices linked to the removal of barriers 
sought by the White Paper. 
Foodstuffs 
Overview 
The foodstuffs sector, the biggest contributor to jobs and value-
added of all EC industries, appears well-placed to confront 
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international competition in the 1990s. But appearances may be 
misleading, for two reasons. The first is that the industry trend 
towards global consolidation is dominated, Unilever and Nestle apart 
(respectively the world's number 1 and 2), by US companies who fill 
the other eight places in the world's top ten. The second is that the 
Community market for foodstuffs, whose 320m consumers should 
provide European companies with a ready-made platform for a 
global challenge, is segmented by a range of trade barriers which, 
despite holding action by the EC, seem to be on the increase. 
The sharpening of the strategic threat is one of the main results of 
European market fragmentation. Expressed in money terms, costs to 
the industry resulting from non-tariff barriers are estimated by the 
research in a spread of Ecu 500-1000m annually, not counting the 
inevitable restrictions in consumer choice. Savings of this size, which 
would follow the elimination of trade obstacles, represent 2%-3% of 
the total value added of a sector which alone accounts for just over 
4% of the Community's gross domestic product. They are estimated 
to equal up to a two-year gain in the industry's productivity. 
More than 200 non-tariff barriers, classified by researchers into 
five types (see Table 7.5), were identified as applying to intra-EC 
trade on the 10 product sectors in the five largest EC countries. 
These products were: biscuits and cake; chocolate and confectionery; 
ice-cream; beer; mineral water; soft drinks; spirits; pasta; soup; baby 
food. They were chosen because of their importance to EC trade, 
their value, and the likelihood of their being subject to significant 
trade barriers. 
Table 7.5 Non-tariff barriers in foodstuffs 
Identified %of Total 
• Specific import 
restrictions 64 29.4 
• Packaging/labelling laws 68 31.2 
• Specific ingredient 
restrictions 33 15.1 
• Content/denomination 
regulations 39 17.9 
• Fiscal discrimination 14 6.4 
218* 100% 
* This is the aggregate number of barriers affecting the 10 items studied in the five 
countries concerned. 
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Trade barriers at work 
Examples of some of these trade obstacles show the types of 
problems that a prospective exporter can run up against in selling to 
another EC country, to say nothing of the market distortions and the 
sub-optimal business structures which these barriers nurture. The 
report considers them among the main reasons responsible for the 
low growth in the industry's intra-EC trade since the late 1970s. 
Soft drinks A non-nutritive sweetener, aspartame, is used for the 
'diet' segment of the soft drink industries in North America and in 
most EC countries - but not all. Aspartame cannot be used in soft 
drinks in Spain (nor could it until early 1988 in France). One result 
of this specific ingredient restriction is that in France, for example, a 
mass diet segment does not exist. Without the barrier, it is estimated 
that such a market segment would emerge, ultimately capturing 
10%-15% of the soft drinks market. 
Beer This is a product which illustrates several types of barriers at 
work. Probably the best-known example of a content/ denomination 
regulation - a rule which prevents a product from using a generic 
name unless it conforms to certain content requirements - is the 
German beer purity law. 
The purity law, censured by the European Court of Justice in 
1987, is also a good example of an import restriction. The result of 
its application has been a highly-fragmented German beer industry 
(1200 brewers, or 75% of the total number in the EC) and a strongly 
protected market (with imports about only 1% of consumption). 
Meanwhile, an example of a fiscal law which could discriminate 
against importers is the wort taxation method for beer. Five EC 
countries levy excise taxes on beer prior to fermentation, less a set 
wastage allowance. Excise taxes for imports into these countries is 
levied on the final product. If a domestic producer can routinely beat 
the pre-set wastage factor, it may derive a cost advantage compared 
to an importer. 
Labelling laws Differing practice here is a hallmark of EC 
countries, partly reflecting misapplication of Community legislation. 
Spain, for example, insists on labelling including health registration 
numbers - a requirement inconsistent with EC rules. 
Barriers such as these are not only extensive but, according to the 
report, they have two other worrying characteristics. They appear to 
be on the increase and are difficult to eliminate once in place. And 
they often demonstrate a high degree of inventiveness and on 
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occasion an uncanny sense of commercial timing on the part of their 
national authors. For instance: 
Recycling laws in Denmark In 1977, the Danish government 
enacted decree 136 which banned the imports of soft drinks in non-
refillable containers. Three years later the European Commission 
ruled against it, saying it violated the Rome Treaty's provisions on 
free intra-EC trade (Article 30). The government promptly replaced 
it with decree 397, which banned the sale of soft drinks and beer in 
non-refillable bottles, imported or domestic. While on the surface 
this appeared non-discriminatory, the fact is that the transportation 
costs of two-way bottles makes them impractical over about 200km -
a distance easily exceeded when exporting to Denmark. Denmark 
has both the highest level of beer consumption per capita in Europe 
after Germany and a negligible level of imports as a percentage of 
consumption. 
Health registration in Spain Health registration for food products in 
Spain was implemented at about the time of its accession to the 
Community. The result is that trade with Spain became more 
difficult from elsewhere in the EC after its accession than before. As 
one EC exporter put it, 'our products were readily acceptable by the 
Spanish govenment up until the time Spain joined the EC. Now we 
have to go through the registration procedure'. 
Direct and indirect costs 
The costs ascribable to the fragmentation of the Community market 
reflect two types of effect: direct and indirect. Direct effects (eg. 
reduction in labelling, packaging and ingredient costs resulting 
directly from trade barriers) are likely to be significant, but not as 
great as indirect effects (eg. longer-run improvements in consumer 
choice, trade and industrial structure). 
The bulk of the direct costs, which the report evaluates at Ecu 
500-lOOOm, are attributable to just six types of barriers. This 
concentration of costs is further underscored by the fact that two 
closely linked barriers - restrictions on vegetable fat in chocolate and 
ice-cream - alone account for over 40% of the total. 
Clearly the benefits directly stemming from the removal of these 
costs are sizeable, but even more important are the indirect benefits 
-essentially improved consumer choice and industrial efficicency. As 
in some other sectors (eg. building materials) the longer-term, 
dynamic effects possess the greatest potential for economic gains. 
Example of benefits for consumers in a real Community home 
market include: 
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Vegetable fat restriction 
in chocolate 
Other barriers 
Plastic containers 
in Italy 
Beer purity laws 
(Germany, Greece) 
Vegetable fat 
restriction in 
ice cream (Germany, 
France, 
Greece, 
Luxembourg) 
Pasta purity laws 
(Italy, France, Greece) 
Saccharimetric 
content in Beer 
(Italy, Spain, Greece) 
Chart 7.1 Distribution of total benefits in the foodstuffs sector (500-lOOOm 
Ecus) 
• less expensive pasta products in Italy and France; 
• a wider range of imported beers in Germany, and lighter beers in 
Italy and Spain; 
• availability of diet soft drinks in France and Spain. 
Dynamic gains in industrial efficiency should be heralded by the 
removal of intra-EC trade barriers. The European food industry, 
says the report, will likely undergo restructuring and consolidation. 
And none too soon, in view of the US-led global concentration of the 
industry which has occurred over the last decade. 
The Americans are strongly placed to exploit the potential of the 
Community market. By contrast to the North American experience, 
EC companies operating in the common market do not in the 
majority of cases have an EC-wide strategy. Only about one in 10 
firms do, together with a presence in the largest five Community 
countries. European food companies have by and large remained 
nationally focused. If they do not react to the pressures from trade 
deregulation by restructuring, EC-based food companies may get left 
behind. 
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Building products 
Overview 
At first glance, building products hardly seem to be a candidate for 
significant intra-Community trade. Many products - bricks, glass, 
lime, plaster etc. - are heavy, meaning that transport costs become a 
major factor; and indeed there are plenty whose price doubles every 
150 km for this reason. Add to this customer requirements which 
differ widely from one country to another, apparently reflecting 
inherent divergences in national tastes, and the potential for large 
international exchange seems restricted. 
Yet appearances are misleading. Surprisingly, the EC market for 
building products (worth Ecu 110 billion in 1985) already features 
extensive trans-border trade, according to the research report which 
analysed in particular the situation in France, Germany, Italy, the 
United Kingdom and Spain. It found that in these four countries, 
even for the heaviest products - cement, glass and other non-metallic 
minerals which make up 42% of the total market - exports and 
imports together accounted for more than half of consumption. 
Import penetration was significant in the markets of all of the four 
larger EC countries: 15% in Italy, 20% in Germany, 30% in France 
and 50% in the UK. 
The potential for still greater cross-border business is currently 
pegged back by a range of barriers, above all myriad technical 
regulations and certification procedures differing from one EC 
country to another. Indeed so-called 'inherent' divergences in 
customer requirements may be largely a case of national tastes 
determined by national regulations. Costs directly associated with 
these and other barriers to trade in building materials are put at Ecu 
820m for the Community. For the five largest member states the 
additional longer term gain expected from EC-wide deregulation - as 
industry improves its economies of scale - is estimated at some Ecu 
1. 7 billion. 
The barriers: national regulations and the North/South divide 
The picture emerging from the research is one of technical 
regulations unevenly spread throughout a Community which is split, 
in this respect, along a North South divide. Countries like Germany 
and France possess the most demanding requirements for prospective 
importers, while Italy and Spain, for example, have less demanding 
regulations. Southern countries often accept foreign technical 
standards and regulations. The UK presents something of a special 
case. Although British standards are significantly different from 
those used elsewhere in the EC, their use is not mandatory. 
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Product standards and certification procedures (the latter often 
lasting years rather than months) head an impressive list of trade 
barriers which also include procurement preferences, national 
requirements for contractors and building regulations. 
A striking but not untypical example of the administrative costs 
and delays faced by transborder trade is the case of a French 
producer of girders which took about five years to obtain the 
technical certification needed to sell in Germany. More generally, the 
report shows that as many as 70% of the products it analysed face 
problems in complying with foreign technical regulations and, 
indeed, about 60% do not meet those regulations. 
On the basis of the EC-wide survey of the industry conducted by 
the research, 85% of companies interviewed identified Germany and 
France as the markets where technical certification was most difficult 
to pass. In these countries the number of technical regulations is 
higher, and their influence on the choices of engineers, architects 
and buyers of building materials is greater. Exporters stressed that in 
Germany great attention is paid by construction firms, foremen and 
consumers to national regulations, with the result that it is almost 
impossible to sell products not meeting their requirements. 
Some of the more discriminating technical standards and regulations 
relate to interior building materials like electrical appliances and 
sanitary ware. Constraints such as mains voltage, plug size and water 
pressure represent a serious impediment to their use Community-
wide. 
Cost savings 
The direct effect of the removal of these trade barriers, which the 
White Paper is seeking through a programme for harmonising 
essential requirements (eg. stability, fire safety and health), will be a 
lowering of the costs borne by European exporters. Harmonization 
of technical regulations will reduce the heavy costs of obtaining 
certifications and, to a lesser extent, reductions will result from the 
removal of customs controls. A drop in transport costs (see Chapter 
2) would also have a clear knock-on effect to the cost of transborder 
trade in building materials. Overall, direct savings for the EC 
industry should total around Ecu 820m. 
Indirect savings, although only attained over a longer time-frame, 
are likely to be much more substantial. Estimated at Ecu 1. 7 billion 
for the five larger EC countries, these will result from economies of 
scale forced on industry by the new competitive pressures - and 
opportunities - of an integrated European market. Research suggests 
that the more dynamic companies will strengthen their international 
strategies by increasing their size and rationalizing their marketing 
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policies. Production shifts between EC countries will be less 
significant, because most companies will tend to set up subsidiaries 
in non-local markets. Firms will face two broad strategic choices -
the 'Northern model' with very complicated regulatory requirements 
leading to use of sophisticated materials; or the less sophisticated 
'Southern model'. 
A further element to be factored into this general outlook is the 
particular problem architects face in operating across EC borders. 
This is highlighted in the Table dealing with barriers to trade in 
business services (see Table 6. 7 p.48). 
Textiles & clothing 
Overview 
The medicine of EC market integration has been administered to 
firms in the textile and clothing sector earlier than most. As a result, 
the industry presents something of a special case - it being perhaps 
the outstanding example of a manufacturing sector which has already 
reaped considerable benefits from progress towards home market 
conditions in Europe. In consequence, many cost savings and 
improvements in industry's economies of scale have already been 
achieved, and remaining trade barriers are of relatively small 
importance to Community producers. Nevertheless, further gains are 
achievable both for manufacturers' costs and for consumer prices. 
T)le last two decades have been marked by major restructuring in 
the textiles and clothing sector in the Community and world-wide. 
There have been three main causes: a sustained surge in exports 
from the developing countries; a slowdown in consumption in the 
industrialized countries; and the increasing impact of European 
market integration. Restructuring has been favoured by EC trade 
measures the partial effect of which has been to keep Community 
prices above world levels. EC production of textiles and clothing, 
whose value added in 1985 was Ecu 54 billion, stopped rising in the 
mid-1970s. In the decade up to 1985 a million jobs were lost in the 
then ten EC member states, leaving sectoral employment at around 
2.5 million, but still around 10% of the total for manufacturing. 
As EC industrial restructuring has proceeded, companies have in 
many cases developed the flexibility needed to respond successfully 
to these pressures. In addition to marked advances in technological 
innovation, industry organization itself has become more flexible, 
mirroring in part the Italian model of dispersed manufacturing units 
balanced by centralized marketing structures. Another salient feature 
is the sharply increased use of sub-contracting. 
Paralleling these developments, intra-EC trade had by and large 
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grown to high levels by 1985. For textiles, where Germany is the 
intra-EC export leader, it was about a quarter of total Community 
consumption. For man-made fibres, a highly integrated sector whose 
export leader is the UK, almost half of EC consumption was met by 
intra-Community trade. But it is a different story for the clothing 
sub-sector, where cross-frontier trade is only half the level achieved 
for textiles. Labour-intensive, clothing production has shifted in part 
to low-wage developing countries. lntra-EC trade is led by the Italian 
industry. By and large trade in textiles and clothing continues to be 
restricted by a system of import quotas distributed between 
individual EC countries. 
Further cost effects of removing residual barriers 
These national quotas (granted under Article 115 of the Rome 
Treaty) necessitate border controls, have a segmenting effect on the 
common market, and are clearly incompatible with the aim of 
complete elimination of intra-Community frontiers by 1992. Be that 
as it may, most producers interviewed for the research find few 
problems living with residual barriers, eg. labelling requirements, 
country of origin problems, differing VAT rates, time lost at border 
crossings. For dynamic companies, selling on the domestic market or 
abroad makes little difference. Indeed, one Italian firm said it had 
greater problems selling to southern Italy than to Germany or 
France. The prevailing picture, at least from industry's standpoint, 
is that integration of the Community market is near completion. 
As a result, the removal of the remaining trade barriers is only 
likely to have marginal effects on intra-EC trade flows. Ensuing 
direct cost reductions, it is estimated, might be around 0.2% of unit 
costs. A further saving of about 0.5% might be ascribable to 
additional economies of scale beyond those already attained. But 
there is limited potential for this - in the textiles sector because of 
the existing degree of specialization, and for clothing because 
production does not lend itself easily to mechanization and 
automation. Gains yet to be realized lie more with marketing than 
with output. 
Outlook for consumer prices 
For textiles and man-made fibres, in which price competition is 
already fierce, further cost reductions may nevertheless be expected 
to run through to consumer prices. 
The story is different for clothing, which is a sector characterized 
by highly differentiated products and where price is not necessarily 
the main factor affecting consumer behaviour. Indeed price 
differences, which in part reflect sharply differing consumer tastes 
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between EC countries, can be as much as 200% for some articles. 
Some businessmen contacted said they set prices for the EC in a 
discretionary range of about 10% of the net final price. 
Factors like this make it difficult to assess the effect on consumer 
prices of any reductions in production costs pursuant to removal of 
trade barriers. It is quite conceivable, for example, that reduction in 
production prices might be absorbed to an extent by the retail 
system, where mark-ups often account for more than half of the final 
consumer pnce. 
Pharmaceuticals 
Overview 
The pharmaceuticals sector presents something of a special case, its 
products being irretrievably linked to the sensitive issue of human 
health. For consumers, strict control on drug safety and quality is 
imperative. This is a concern for the public authorities who are also 
directly involved because they foot around 50% on average of the 
pharmaceutical bill. Industry, on the other hand, has to finance 
increasingly heavy investments, mainly in R&D, the return on which 
is neither short-term nor sure. 
This mingling of public and private interests makes the pharma-
ceuticals market highly characteristic - one in which typically the 
final consumer does not pay for the product, in which the producer 
is not free to fix his product price, and in which government is 
simultaneously the principal paying agent and price controller. 
Needless to say, the sector is highly regulated, with two areas of 
regulation - the market registration procedure for new products, and 
price controls - being the most important from the standpoint of the 
European market. 
The time and funding requirements for pharmaceutical research 
are becoming steadily greater, and not just because of the efforts 
needed to get new drugs admitted to differing national markets and 
of the costs created by the potential for discrimination in pricing 
procedures (see below). The chief cause is that traditional medical 
research is reaching its limits, and its successor, the commercial 
exploitation of biotechnologies, is in expensive infancy. Only the 
largest of firms can make the estimated Ecu 75m outlay needed to 
bring each new chemical entity (NCE) to the market, after 8-12 years 
of testing and evaluation. 
Faced with these facts, EC policy is seeking to build a framework 
which discourages government favours for local producers and 
stimulates the industry's R&D efforts by freer competitiOn. The 
opportunities created by this will be for EC governments and 
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companies to seize, otherwise the main gains of market integration 
will be for extra-EC firms. With the maintenance of high levels of 
public health in the EC linked significantly to activities of the 
Community's own pharmaceuticals industry, it may not be in the 
interests of EC patients to become unduly dependent on research 
conducted outside the Community. 
Registration procedures biggest focus for cost savings 
Admission of new products to national markets is subject to 
registration procedures to ensure that a drug is safe, effective and of 
adequate quality before it is put on sale. 
Despite action by the Community, considerable problems still face 
companies as a result of lengthy and differing drug registration 
procedures between EC countries. Over the last two decades, EC 
initiatives have led to the convergence of the requirements made by 
national regulatory authorities. As a result there are few differences 
in technical standards (eg. all EC countries accept test evidence 
obtained elsewhere in the Community), and a uniform 120-day 
decision has been agreed. 
In practice, however, the story is different. There remain 
substantial differences between countries - eg. varying methods of 
evaluating evidence, and, above all considerable delays in processing 
applications. Currently only France approaches the 120-day limit for 
drug registration procedures. Germany and the UK take about two 
years, and Italy and Spain three or more. A single European 
registration agency could be considered as a way of easing the 
present situation by helping to overcome differences in national 
practice. Industry is concerned that such a structure might be too 
burdensome. The key issue remains the speed of registration, which 
should be improved. 
Delays in registration trigger a range of costs. Losses in revenues 
suffered by companies forced to wait over the agreed 120-day limit 
are estimated at between Ecu 100-175m. Working capital tied up by 
such delays is calculated at a further Ecu 20-28m. Multiple 
registration is an additional problem and, based on the extra staff 
employed by the major companies to handle it, is estimated at Ecu 
40-SSm. Adding these items up, the total cost of non-Europe due to 
differences in registration practices lies in a spread of 0.5%-0.8% of 
EC industry costs. 
Pricing procedures 
All EC countries have measures to control public expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals. These measures, differing from one country to the 
other, involve controls both on prices for new products and on 
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changes in prices of drugs already on the market, as well as on their 
reimbursement by social security systems. 
Research has thrown up definite evidence that these national 
pricing systems may operate with discriminatory bias. Prices and 
profit margins in several member states depend on the scale and 
nature of a company's local activities. Local performance requirements 
of this sort clearly operate in favour of the domestic manufacturer, 
while involving the foreign firm in excessive decentralisation of key 
functions. Drug production, being essentially a two-phase process, 
involves manufacture of so-called active ingredients at a limited 
number of sites, and then the conversion of these into dosage form, 
frequently in a variety of sites. Decentralization of this latter process is, 
according to the research, often a result of pressure exerted by host 
governments during price negotiations. Bowing to such pressures can 
mean sacrificing economies of scale. 
To discourage this distorted use of national pricing systems, the 
Commission has opted for a gradualist approach. The draft Community 
directive on price controls, proposed in 1986, seeks to give the 
manufacturer greater certainty on how national pricing systems operate 
by requiring them to be more transparent. 
The research considers some alternative scenarios, which might 
develop in the wake of the transparency directive, based on different 
degrees of concentration realized in response to an easing of 
local performance requirements. Although necessarily tentative, they 
suggest the potential for savings in operating costs which the directive 
might produce. If prices remained unchanged, the firm's operating 
surplus might be increased by between 7% and 14%. Alternatively, if 
passed on in their entirety to the consumer, the result could be to 
reduce expenditure on pharmaceuticals by between 1.3% and 2.4% on 
average. 
Outlook 
By and large, the research tends to support the view that Community 
legislation aimed at further freeing of the European pharmaceuticals 
market could release considerable resources. These could be used to 
increase company margins, thus improving the capacity of firms to 
innovate, and to reduce drug prices, thus reducing public expenditure. 
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PART II 
THE 1992 OPPORTUNITY: 
THE GAINS IN 
PROSPECT 

8 From market costs to economic benefits 
- a twin-track approach for estimating 
overall gains 
The costs caused by European market fragmentation have been 
highlighted in the preceding examples, which illustrate the scale of 
market barriers and how they impact on selected sectors of business. 
As indicated in Part I, these costs take various shapes but are 
essentially of two types: those which will be eliminated immediately 
once barriers are removed; and those, much more sizeable, which are 
economic inefficiencies that will only be unravelled and replaced by 
more dynamic practices over time under the competitive pressures of 
the integrated EC market. Looked at another way, these costs are 
the expression in negative terms of the benefits that will emerge for 
the Community economy as a whole after the barriers are eliminated. 
But to gauge these overall benefits, a more general analysis than that 
pursued in Part I becomes necessary. This is the purpose of Part II. 
Order-of-magnitude estimates of the benefits to be had from the 
European home market of the 1990s are outlined, using two distinct 
but complementary approaches, in respectively chapters 9 and 10. 
Use of these two methods - respectively a micro-economic and 
macro-economic approach - was dictated by the novelty of the 
conceptual challenge to be overcome in making the estimate, and by 
the inevitable unevenness in the empirical data on which it is based. 
This in turn made cross-checking of the results, rendered possible by 
employing two approaches, all the more necessary. As will be seen, 
the two estimates converge on broadly similar - and economically 
very substantial - levels of gain for the European economy. 
A word, for the general reader, to demystify the economic jargon, 
and briefly situate the two approaches. 
The micro-economic estimate This first approach (Chapter 9) takes as 
its starting point the impact of removing non-tariff barriers on the 
individual actors of the Community economy, and seeks to establish 
what general benefits accrue to them - be they companies, 
consumers or government - as a result of the supply-side shock given 
by market integration. 
Viewed from this standpoint, highlights of the 1992 picture 
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include a substantial gain for consumers ('consumer surplus') as 
prices drop and product choice and quality increase under the 
impact of open competition. Producers face a more mixed outlook. 
In the short term, profits (particularly those resulting from 
monopoly or protected positions) may be squeezed. But in the longer 
run, business as a whole is expected to respond to the new 
competitive climate by making various adjustments - eg. scaling up 
production ('economies of scale of production'), gaining experience 
of how to produce most efficiently ('economies of scale of learning' 
or 'learning curve effect'), eliminating management inefficiencies 
('X-inefficiency' to the economist), and by improved capacity to 
innovate. Gains from these and other adjustments, when netted out, 
lead to an increase in the Community's 'net economic welfare'. This 
increase is its 'net welfare gain'. 16 
The macro-economic estimate Chapter 10 looks at how the supply-
side shock given by removal of barriers will reverberate on the main 
indicators of the Community economy - indicators like gross 
domestic product, inflation, employment, public budgets and the 
external position. 
The process is in essence simple. It starts with the lowering of 
production costs and with gains in productivity which will result 
from EC market integration. The ensuing price reductions will in 
turn have an important knock-on effect on the main mechanisms of 
the macro-economy. They will increase purchasing power; change 
the competitive positions of individual EC countries with each other 
and of the Community with the outside world; they will provide the 
basis for a durable attack on unemployment; stimulate demand yet 
reduce inflation; in short, they will provide an entirely new outlook-
and trajectory - for economic growth between now and the end of 
the century. 
These beneficial effects provide a further and substantial impact. 
They give the managers of the general economy - governments -
much greater leeway for measures that would magnify the primary 
gains of market integration into benefits much larger still. 
A final introductory point. This is that the gains forecast for the 
European economy will not appear as if by divine intervention. 
Realizing the potential that is on offer presupposes a robustly 
positive response to the supply-side opportunity by business and 
government. 1992 is not simply a date. It is a programme, and a 
strategy. 
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9 In quest of Europe's lost 200 billions-
a micro-economic analysis of gains 
from market integration 
The competitive vista of 1992 
A dramatically new environment awaits consumers and producers 
alike in the integrated Community market post-1992. As shown in 
Part I, the removal of a whole range of non-tarrifbarriers- eg. frontier 
red-tape, closed public procurement, a plethora of differing product 
standards - leads to an immediate downward impact on costs. But 
this is merely the primary effect, and thus only a minor part of the 
story explaining the environment of the European home market in 
the next decade. 
Much more substantial gains will be generated by completion of 
the EC internal market. Its attainment means not just the simple 
elimination of constraints sapping effective business performance, 
but above all a new and pervasive competitive climate. One in which 
the players of the European economy - manufacturing and service 
companies, and consumers of their output - can exploit new 
opportunities and better use available resources. 
Four major consequences may be expected from the combined 
impact of the elimination of barriers and the subsequent boost to 
competition: 
• significant reduction in costs, thanks to improved exploitation by 
companies of economies of scale in production and business 
organization; 
• improved efficiency within companies, widespread industrial 
reorganization, and a situation where prices move downward 
toward production costs under the pressure of more competitive 
markets; 
• new patterns of competition between entire industries and 
reallocation of resources as, in home market conditions, real 
comparative advantages play the determining role in market 
success; 
• increased innovation, new business processes and products 
generated by the dynamics of the internal market. 
Of course these various effects will not occur simultaneously. 
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They will be spread over differing time-spans. But their overall 
impact is clear. They will increase the competitivity of business and 
the general economic welfare of the consumer. 
For consumers: an unqualified bonus 
Put simply, consumers will be better off. Be they private individuals 
or intermediary businesses, the outlook is unreservedly good. They 
will no longer be confronted, as in today's Community, with 
enormous price differences depending on their country of residence. 
Apart from inevitable variations in prices linked to inherent 
characteristics of a particular product or service, European consumers 
will be paying a similar price for the same item. And, as the item will 
tend to be produced in the cheapest way, the level of this price will 
be on a downward journey. There will also be greater consumer 
choice, as market integration and increased competition lead to 
differentiated products as well as economies of scale. 
For companies: the challenge of success, but an end to national soft 
options 
For firms the era of the national soft option will be over. But for 
companies able to scale up their performance to the demands of 
increased competition, the outlook for sales and profits is dynamic. 
The boost given to competition by increased intra-EC trade will 
stimulate the competitivity of European businesses in three ways: 
1. Lower input costs Companies will be able to cover their basic 
requirements - labour, capital, plant and components - more cost-
effectively. This cost improvement in production factors stems 
directly from lower prices for many intermediate goods and services 
as well as from general market integration, and leads in turn to more 
rational factors, allocation between firms, sectors and countries. 
2. Responsiveness of profits to competition Profits could clearly be 
squeezed by Europe's competitive renewal, but for high performance 
firms they may improve as a result of gains in business' internal 
efficiency. Two main factors will have a bullish effect on company 
margins. First, the increased dimension of the market means higher 
utilization rates for production capacity and possible expansion of 
capital stock, and enables reorganization and concentration of 
business activities. Second, improved internal cost controls should 
reduce overheads, lead to 'best practice' production techniques and, 
by sharpening the demands on it, strengthen the quality of European 
corporate management. From the profit standpoint, EC integration 
gives management a supply side shock - a market-sent opportunity 
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to optimize existing resources, modrrnize plant, and to promote new 
activities and new ways of organizing work. 
3. A spur to innovation Market integration brings with it a 
number of factors giving European firms the chance to regain 
technological leadership. Among these factors: European market 
liberalization and growth; the removal of market entry barriers (eg. 
standards); the creation of new companies, particularly in high tech 
sectors; and the rapid development of cross-frontier business 
cooperation for R&D. Only when European companies regain this 
leadership can they call the shots- or, in the language of economics, 
go from being 'price-takers' to 'price-makers'. 
In short, strengthening European competitivity leads, so to speak, 
to the reconquest of the European market. Failure to meet the 
demands of competitivity does not mean that the challenges of the 
European market will not be mastered. They will. But not by 
Europeans. 
The successive phases of benefit from market integration 
The gate to market integration is the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers. Once unlocked, the gate opens on to a space much larger 
than expected, and it is the interplay of newly-liberated factors in 
this extended space that provides the full picture of the dynamic 
gains to be had from the process. The cause-and-effect circuit of 
micro-economic gains resultant on market integration is given in the 
flow-chart on page p. 76. 
Chart 9.1 traces, first, how the removal of non-tariff barriers leads 
to a direct reduction of initial costs and, given stable competitive 
conditions, to lower prices. It also shows how barrier removal 
increases competitive pressures which, in turn, trigger more price 
reductions and pull prices down towards costs via an impact on 
profit margins. 
This chapter looks at the various aspects of this interplay. The 
analysis has had to overcome a range of complex problems including 
limited EC-wide data and methodological challenges. Nonetheless, 
using the most prudent of hypotheses, the overall result is 
impressive, and is detailed below in successive sections whose main 
themes are now rapidly outlined. 
On the basis of the findings illustrated in Part I, it was established 
that the removal of non-tariff barriers leads to direct reductions in 
the costs and prices for goods and services for final consumption, 
and also for intermediary items, and that these savings then lead to 
growth in domestic and international demand. Demand growth in 
turn enables increases in the volume of output and loosens the 
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constraints which, hitherto, have hindered the full exploitation of 
economies of scale and the 'learning curve' effect (companies 
learning to do things more efficiently as a result of doing them more 
often). Section 1 examines these potential cost savings. 
Beyond gains in economies of scale and learning, are those 
pursuant to business rationalization and the elimination of sub-
optimal production units - gains which come about in response to 
the new competitive stimuli injected by the integrated market. 
Section 2 looks at the impact of these stimuli on price levels and 
company profits. 
Section 3, using two separate approaches for analysing the same 
phenomena, calculates the likely spread of benefits to be expected 
from the completion of the internal market. These benefits are 
expressed in terms of improvements in the economic welfare 
of consumers and producers. The dynamic effects of EC-wide 
competition on Europe's innovation and technology performance are 
outlined in Section 4. 
While some of the gains from the internal market will occur 
almost automatically, most require changes in the behaviour of the 
economy's main players to achieve maximum impact. Section 5 
outlines the new strategic challenges facing companies. These 
challenges will only be taken up by companies if they have credible 
assurances that competititive behaviour is adequately policed. A firm 
competition policy is part and parcel of the European home market 
of the 1990s (Section 6). 
1 Economies of scale and experience: outlook for business 
Increased trade and sharper competition triggered by market 
integration will enable firms to make savings linked to larger-scale 
production. Empirical studies show that, for the sectors considered 
(see Chapters 6 and 7), the greater the opening to trade, the greater 
the move towards the size needed to achieve the necessary economies 
of scale to compete. Compound benefits result. It is not merely the 
productivity of transformed resources that is enhanced: the additional 
economies of scale for the extra output for export allows a lowering 
of cost on the total amount of existing production. 
The analysis here had to take account of three complicating 
factors: 
a) Potential gains vary significantly by industry: the expected 
reductions in production costs resultant on economies of scale 
are of the order of 1% for sectors like petroleum products, but 
reach a spread of 3%--6% for heavy electrical equipment and 
means of transport other than cars. 
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b) Diverse applications of economies of scale: in addition to 
production, they may be possible for business organization, 
marketing, finance, and R&D. In some of these cases, 
economies of scale are difficult to quantify. 
c) Adjustments to scale take different forms: there are two main types, 
with varying time-spans for their achievement. First, more 
intensive use of existing capacity in response to increased 
demand for the output of differing industries in differing 
countries, depending on their comparative advantage. Second, 
restructuring within each industry in each country, involving the 
disappearance of the smallest or least efficient companies, or 
their concentration, and the development of new and greater 
specialization. 
Taking just manufacturing industries, the calculations show that 
the cost savings to be had from economies of scale for production 
would be around Ecu 60 billion. The vast majority of these savings 
(80%) would derive from restructuring. 
There is no doubt that this estimate, large as it may seem, 
understates overall gains from this source. It takes no account of 
economies of scale in areas other than production, and it does not 
include the service sector of the economy. Nor are the so-called 
learning-curve effects part of the calculation. These can be very 
significant, as studies have repeatedly shown. It is now established 
that the accumulation over time of the production of goods and 
services has, through learning acquired 'on the job', triggered 
considerable drops in the cost of producing additional units. Thus, 
given a doubling of overall production, unit costs for supplementary 
production will drop an average of 10% in refining and in car 
manufacturing, and 20% in aircraft manufacture. 17 Inasmuch as the 
completion of the internal market will tend to increase the scale of 
production and growth in demand, the accompanying gains for 
companies from using their accumulated production experience seem 
certain to be considerable. 
2 Price levels and profit margins : business and the supply-side 
shock 
For a given product, competitive pressures tend to trigger a 
downward convergence of prices. This factor in turn lowers profit 
margins to the extent that they have been artificially sustained above 
competitive levels. Moreover, the adjustment of prices to supply and 
demand pressures is generally greater and quicker in a competitive 
environment. Market integration in Europe will lead to substantial 
gains of this type. 
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Price differences 
A starting point of the benefit analysis here is the observable price 
differences presently obtaining for a given product between EC 
countries. Such differences, of course, cannot be entirely ascribed 
to the non-Europe factor, indeed some may occur within national 
markets. They may in part reflect certain fairly immutable 
characteristics - transport costs, the inherent advantages of certain 
locations, variations in consumer tastes, custom and culture. 
Nonetheless, such 'natural barriers' cannot alone explain the size of 
the before-tax differences in prices, nor the fact that country-to-
country discrepancies are much greater than those occurring within a 
national market (see Table 9.1 for a price comparison in the home 
electronics sector). 
Taking the situation across the board, the general before-tax price 
variation from the Community average in 1985 was 15.2% for 
consumer goods and 12.4% for capital equipment. These global 
averages conceal much greater price dispersion for individual items, 
eg. tea (27%); ladies' linen and hosiery (31 %); glass and crockery 
(21%); books (49%); boilermaking equipment (22%). Examples of 
price differences in the service sector (tax inclusive) appear even 
more spectacular : telephone and telegraph services (50%); electrical 
repairs (42%); road and rail transport (28%). 
Such differences witness forcibly to the existence of artificial 
barriers stopping the natural play of arbitrage between member state 
markets. For illustrations of the particular impact of specific non-
Table 9.1 National price differences compared with intra-EC differences- the 
case of home electronics in Germany 
F.R. Germany* Community** 
Compact-disc players 10.6 14.9 
Radio recorders 7.3 16.2 
Turntables 9.6 10.8 
Video recorders 5.7 13.2 
Cam recorders 6.8 11.3 
Video cassettes 5.7 13.3 
Washing machines 3.3 13.4 
Colour TV 6.4 13.5 
* Source: Institut fiir Angewandte Verbraucherforschung (IF A V). The coefficient of 
variation has been calculated on the basis of average prices in major German towns 
** Source: Bureau Europeen des Unions des consommateurs (BEUC) and Eurostat 
(last two products). The number of Member States taken into account varies 
according to the product 
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tariff barriers, see for example Chapter 3 (public procurement) and 
Chapters 6 and 7 for instances of their sectoral impact. 
Price differences are reinforced by restrictive competitive behaviour 
and the market structures for certain goods and services in certain 
countries. A particularly striking instance is financial services, where 
cartelistic practices in some countries result in large price differentials 
in the EC, eg. for interest rates on consumer credits (see also Table 
6.1 ). Studies carried out in Britain and France show just how 
substantial are the losses in efficiency linked to monopoly power in 
certain industries. There is, moreover, an irresistible correlation 
(more than 80%) between the sectors for whose products there are 
large price differences between EC countries and those where 
industrial power is concentrated. 
The European home market will do much to put a stop to this sort 
of business. By liberating cross-frontier trade flows, it will create the 
permanent prospect and credible threat of new market entrants 
coming in to undermine non-competitive prices. Not only actual but 
potential competition will be reinforced - the door, once opened, 
will be permanently ajar. Prices, within the limits imposed by 
'natural barriers', will move remorselessly nearer to costs. 
Profit margins 
One expected consequence of strengthened competition is a squeeze 
on those profit margins which are simply due to enterprises cashing 
in on monopoly or protected positions. At the same time, 
competitive European companies will reap considerable cost savings 
which, despite the downward impact of lowering prices, will keep 
profits buoyant. They will be further boosted by their strengthened 
capacity to take on foreign competition for global markets, and by 
the structural increase in European demand which will be theirs for 
the taking. 
The positive outlook for lower company costs, reflecting both the 
direct impact of barrier removal and the subsequent exploitation of 
economies of scale and learning, has already been outlined both in 
Part I and in section 1 of this chapter. Production costs will come 
down for goods and services for final consumption and also for 
intermediary goods. The reduction in these input costs will have a 
radiating effect throughout the European business economy. 
These are by no means the only gains in prospect for companies. 
It is widely accepted that, without the discipline of market pressures, 
firms rapidly become victims of ineffective cost control, under-
utilized resources, out-of-date technology, inefficient internal 
operations - in short, bad management. Inefficiencies of this sort 
have been given prominence in various studies, which estimate that 
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internal reorganization can alone lead to savings m company 
overheads of more than 10%. 
In sum, EC market integration heralds a prospect of rich pickings 
to be earned, not inherited. For European companies prepared to 
seize the competitive gauntlet, operational rationalization and 
internal reorganization will lead to greater competitivity and a 
durably strong bottom line. 
3 Estimating the gains in European economic welfare 
Estimating the overall gains for the European economy from EC 
market integration is a challenging process. Two distinct methods of 
evaluation were used. In simple terms, these two methods, briefly 
explained below, 18 may be described as : 
• a price convergence approach 
• a welfare gains approach. 
Price convergence approach 
This method is based on the price dispersion between EC countries 
summarized in the preceding section. Its starting point is that 
completion of the internal market will have a different impact on 
prices depending on the characteristics of the industry concerned. 
Thus it is assumed that price differences in sectors with few or weak 
non-tariff barriers and a high level of import penetration (eg. man-
made fibres, optical instruments, dairy products) are a consequence 
of factors not by and large ascribable to the absence of a European 
home market. By contrast, the opposite is the case for sectors with 
high barriers and low penetration (office automation, railway rolling 
stock, telecom equipment and services, pharmaceuticals, etc). A 
characteristic common to many of these sectors (see Part I) is the 
predominant purchasing role played by the public authorities. 
With this as its starting point, the following approach was 
adopted. First, for sectors with low non-tariff barriers, the 
assumption was made that such price peaks as there are will be 
brought down to the Community average under the pressure of 
market integration. 
Second, for sectors protected by high barriers, the assumption is 
that integration will lead to a price level equal to the average of the 
prices obtaining in the two EC countries with the lowest levels at the 
moment. This, it should be stressed, is a conservative basis on which 
to calculate gains, since it is perfectly possible that the lowest prices 
in today's EC market will, as a result of cost savings brought on by 
intensified competition, be reduced. 
The aggregate drop in price levels is one way of measuring the 
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overall gains from EC market integration. It reflects cost reductions 
directly stemming from barrier removal and impacting not just on 
the trade of goods but on their production; indirect cost reductions 
triggered by the better use of economies of scale and by improved 
internal company organization; and finally, the unfettering of 
business' competitive powers in an integrated market of continental 
proportions. 
Using this approach and assuming that present output remains 
unchanged, total savings from the drop in prices is of the order of 
4.8% of gross domestic product. 19 It should be stressed that these 
savings do not express the EC's welfare gains in full, for they take no 
account of the rises in overall output resultant on lower prices, nor of 
the probability that the lowest prices presently observed will 
themselves fall as industry is more fully rationalized at the European 
level. 
Welfare gains approach 
The second method covers this omission. It seeks to translate the 
available empirical data into figures expressing the overall economic 
advantage, or welfare gains, for the Community's consumers and 
producers as a result of market integration. 
Two types of gain are to be distinguished. The first is the gain for 
consumers (or 'consumer surplus') stemming from lower prices and 
larger purchases. This corresponds in part to a drop in profit for 
producers faced with new competition. The size of this drop has to 
be deducted from the level of the consumer surplus. 
The second type of gain is more substantial because the reductions 
are in costs linked to operational inefficiencies which are a pure gain 
for the economic community as a whole. Since this gain affects 
output across the board, it is clearly large in size. Thus, while the 
removal of tariff barriers (involving drops in government revenue), 
for example, leads to fairly small gains in overall economic welfare, 
the gain from the elimination of non-tariff barriers is of substantial 
economic significance. 
The calculations made to evaluate overall economic welfare gains 
have taken account of these distinctions. This was done with the aid 
of theoretical models for international trade analysis. These have 
been given greater sophistication of late, enabling accurate 
analysis of certain aspects of trade not adequately treated by 
traditional international trade theory. They take into account, for 
example, phenomena like economies of scale, product differentiation 
and imperfect competitive behaviour where suppliers exercise a 
certain control over prices. Applying these models to some ten 
industrial sectors in five country groups (France, Germany, Italy, 
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the United Kingdom and the Benelux group), the authors20 conclude 
that the lowering of non-tariff barriers impmves EC economic 
welfare, thanks to growth in EC trade and output, to lower unit 
production costs and to more diversified products. There would be 
further welfare benefits from European integration in the medium 
and long term, according to this theory. These reflect reductions in 
cost as a result of industrial restructuring, and a narrowing of the 
gap between prices and costs in the wake of the curtailment of 
monopoly power. 
The significance of these exercises in theoretical simulation lies not 
so much in their end result as in their identification of the relative 
size of the causes of gains in economic welfare. On this their message 
is clear. The more the European market is integrated, the greater the 
contribution of indirect gains (derived from business restructuring 
and intensified competition) as opposed to direct gains (largely 
reflected by increased intra-EC trade). According to this approach, 
indirect gains would constitute around 60% of the Community's 
overall benefit in economic welfare. 
The total estimate of economic gain to the EC, using these various 
methods, is situated in a spread around a mid-point of over Ecu 200 
billion (for the twelve EC member states, expressed in 1988 prices). 
The range represents between 4.3% and 6.4% of the Community's 
gross domestic product in 1988. 
Table 9.2 outlines the potential welfare gains for consumers and 
producers. It presents the aggregate beneficial effects from reductions 
in costs and prices for each of the four successive phases in the 
micro-economic analysis of the process of welfare gains. 
The calculation set out in Table 9.2 has been carried out in four 
distinct steps: 
1 Step 1: the removal of barriers which directly affect intra-EC 
trade, essentially customs formalities and related delays (for 
details, see Chapter 2); 
2 Step 2: the effects of removing barriers to production (ie. not 
simply intra-EC trade): these are barriers which hinder foreign 
market entrants and thus the free play of competition. Examples 
include protective public procurement (see Chapter 3), divergent 
national standards and regulatory diversity (Chapters 4 & 5), and 
restrictions on services (Chapter 6) and on manufacturing 
(Chapter 7). Such obstacles do much more than hinder trade. In 
limiting the impact of competitive pressures, they sustain excess 
costs and over-pricing. 
3 Step 3: represents the cost reductions achieved by businesses 
though exploiting more fully potential economies of scale 
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Table 9.2 Potential gains in economic welfare for the EC resulting from 
completion of the internal market 
Step 1 
Gains from removal of barriers affecting trade 
Step2 
Gains from removal of barriers affecting overall 
production 
Gains from removing barriers (sub-total) 
Step3 
Gains from exploiting economies of scale more fully 
Step4 
Gains from intensified competition reducing business 
inefficiencies and monopoly profits 
Gains from market integration (sub-total) 
Total 
- for 7 Member States at 1985 prices 
- for 12 Member States at 1988 prices 
- mid-point of above 
Billions 
Ecu 
8---9 
57-71 
65-80 
61 
46 
62*-107 
127-187 
174-258 
216 
% 
of Gdp 
0.2-0.3 
2.0-2.4 
2.2-2.7 
2.1 
1.6 
2.1*-3.7 
4.3-6.4 
4.3-6.4 
5.3 
* This alternative estimate for the sum of steps 3 and 4 cannot be broken down 
between the two steps. 
Source: Commission of EC, study of Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, op. cit. 
Notes: The ranges for cetain lines represent the results of using alternative sources 
of information and methodologies. The seven Member States (Germany, France, 
Italy, United Kingdom, Benelux) account for 88% of the Gdp of the EC twelve. 
Extrapolation of the results in terms of the same share of Gdp for the seven and twelve 
Member States is not likely to over-estimate the total for the twelve. The detailed 
figures in the table relate only to the seven Member States because the underlying 
studies mainly covered those countries. 
(Section 1 above). These gains arise in part in the short-run as 
increases in production allow fixed investment costs to be covered 
by larger sales volumes. To a much more important extent, 
however, they accrue in the longer run as companies and 
production units are restructured and get closer to the most 
efficient possible scales of production. 
4 Step 4: represents other gains in efficiency due to intensified 
pressures of competition (see Section 2 above). These gains may, 
for example, concern administrative overhead costs, over-manning 
at all levels, and inefficient management of inventories. Evidence 
from a variety of sources suggests that these kinds of efficiency 
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gains can be of considerable importance. In addition, where 
monopoly profits exist as a result of market protection, they will 
be reduced or eliminated, and thus offer gains for consumers 
through price reductions. 
This aggregate outcome, which emphasizes if need be the political 
and economic imperative of the White Paper programme, is in a way 
still not the complete picture. It fails to take full account of the 
overall dynamics to be unleashed by the creation of a European 
home market. Notable among these are new business strategies and 
technical innovation. 
4 Market dynamics and technological progess 
For companies, costs and prices are increasingly just two of the 
components of their competitive strategy for the 1990s - indeed as 
of now. Today, more than ever before, is witness to the emergence 
of more telling competitive weaponry. Business' capacity to develop 
new forms of organization, to penetrate new geographical markets, 
to invent new products and new processes - these are the stuff of 
which competitive edge is made. Comparative advantage is no longer 
seen as divine inheritance, nor are market structures and rivals' 
behaviour set in tablets of stone. 
These 'non-price' factors, central to competitive business strategies, 
are dynamic and subject to continual change. And among these 
factors, the role of innovation is crucial. It is the key to the 
revitalization of traditional sectors, able to transform certain areas of 
textiles, for example, into high-performance industries, and it is the 
sine qua non for lasting success in the rapidly expanding high 
technology sectors. 
The competitive pressures accompanying EC market integration 
will impact positively on technical progress, both as regards product 
and process invention and the ensuing innovations. And the capacity 
to innovate will itself further fuel these pressures. So much is clear. 
It is less easy, however, to measure the effects. But some signposts in 
this rapidly changing landscape may serve as a guide. 
Worthy of note is the fact that large firms conduct no more 
research, proportionately speaking, than smaller firms. Nor are they 
responsible for a proportionately larger number of innovations. 21 
The enlargement of market dimension and the restructuring of 
Europe's productive potential should enable many firms to undertake 
and finance costly and risky R&D projects, and to market the new 
products and processes emerging from them. Even more important, 
perhaps, the sharpening of cross-border competition - resultant on 
the reduction of market entry barriers, the creation of new firms and 
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on the greater mobility of researchers - will intensify innovations and 
accelerate their spread. 
The positive link between innovation and competition is confirmed 
in, among others, a recent study. 22 Innovations are more numerous 
in industries with low market entry barriers and high production 
growth. The positive impact of market integration on business 
innovation will be most acute in high technology sectors and in those 
with a strong outlook for growth in demand. 
A virtuous circle 
These are precisely the sectors in which Europe's loss of market 
shares since the beginning of the 1980s has been most marked, and 
where a new competitive thrust is most needed. The completion of 
the internal market could thus trigger a virtuous circle, where 
greater competition stimulates European innovation and innovation 
in turn stimulates European competitivity. 
This type of competition has of course nothing to do with the 
textbook version. But it has a lot to do with the reality of strategic 
rivalry played out between a limited number of firms in a situation of 
uncertainty. Seen against this background of oligopoly struggles, it 
appears that the EC's pattern of cooperative behaviour for R&D, 
coupled with tough competition in the end market, might further the 
general welfare more than totally non-cooperative behaviour. This 
leads to consideration of the role expected of the economy's main 
players - Europe's corporate citizens - as they move to realize the 
potential gains of the European home market. 
5 Business strategies for the European home market 
It is clear that the benefits expected from market integration will not 
appear at the wave of a wand. To bring them about many changes 
are needed, not least the gearing up of business strategies to meet the 
new market's greater challenges. 
Indications of how companies intend to adjust to the 1992 en-
vironment are provided in the business survey conducted in 1987.23 
They seem to envisage three main types of action: measures aimed at 
restructuring and improving productivity, growing recourse to inter-
national link-ups, especially for R&D, and penetration of new 
markets. 
Company restructuring Restructuring can occur internally or ex-
ternally. Internal restructuring occurs, for example, when companies 
rationalize their activities, refocusing them around a main line of 
business and dropping areas foreign to it, or when they move to 
extend their penetration of the enlarged home market. Examples of 
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external restructuring are more visible. They include take-overs and 
mergers enabling improved exploitation of economies of scale, access 
to new geographical markets, and a greater division of labour 
between the various parts of the European market. Such operations 
can help companies attain a truly European dimension and thus 
escape from the narrow logic of the 'national champion'. 
Statistics for 1985-8624 show for EC companies an increase in the 
numbers of take-overs and asset mergers they undertook both cross-
border in the Community and with non-EC partners, at the expense 
of purely national link-ups. (All the same, in 1986 nearly two-thirds 
of mergers and majority share links were still taking place behind 
national borders.) As regards transnational operations, intra-EC 
mergers were nearly twice as numerous as those involving non-EC 
partners. Worthy of remark is that majority share acquisitions were 
dominated by large-size companies. Around 50% of these acquisitions 
were made by companies with turnover in excess of Ecu 1,000m. 
For small and medium-sized companies, attainment of the home 
market should create the occasion for consolidation of often sub-
optimal units geared to meeting the demands of narrow national 
product markets. 
At the same time, a cautionary note needs to be struck. Successful 
business restructuring depends on a variety of other factors - new 
modes of company management and organization, the training of 
management and its international mobility, as well as its openness to 
social dialogue. Various studies suggest that there is considerable 
room for progress in these areas. 25 
Inter-company cooperative link-ups The total number of newly-
created joint subsidiaries remains fairly stable. 26 Such operations 
mounted cross-border between EC firms remain a minority (24. 7% 
of the total), less than those involving a non-EC partner (33.3%), 
while purely national operations continue strongest (42%). A similar 
picture emerges for minority participations. More generally, planned 
cooperative agreements run into a list of obstacles which is as 
impressive as the resultant failure rate. On top of the inherent 
problems faced by companies in joining forces (getting the right 
balance between partners, setting up cost-effective management, 
achieving fair distribution of the fruits of cooperation, etc.) come a 
series of further hurdles linked in the main to business law and 
industry regulation. 
Seven such barriers have particular impact (see diagram below).27 
Costliest of these barriers for trans-border cooperative start-ups 
and management appear to be the near absence of relevant European 
company and tax law. They include the problems of EC-wide tax 
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Regulatory blocks to business link-ups* 
• discriminatory national industrial policies 
• differences in company law 
• conflicting tax requirements 
• disparities in product and process standards 
• some aspects of the operation of capital markets 
• intra-EC trade barriers 
• differences in social security arrangements (eg. pension 
rights) 
* see Chapter 5 for further details of some of these 
consolidation in fiscally disparate environments and of cross-frontier 
intra-company pricing. Obstacles to the mobility of human resources 
linked to differing social security laws are also shown to be 
significant. Divergent national standards, meanwhile, make heavy 
inroads into R&D budgets. 
The overriding paradox which emerges is that international co-
operative link-ups between EC partner firms have up to now proved 
less frequent than those with a non-EC participant. The scope for 
correcting this balance is considerable once the barriers come down. 
At the same time, links with non-EC participants are also very useful 
for European competitiveness and might be more used as a platform 
for attacking world markets (as well as the non-EC partner's 
penetration of Community markets). Thus once a European 
company has reached a threshold of competitive performance thanks 
to cost savings inherent in economies of scale and learning, and a 
level of strategic capacity thanks to its marketing, R&D and human 
resource power, it is well placed to penetrate foreign markets 
through an alliance with a local company. 
Market entry is a key factor influencing the success of new business 
strategies. Chief among the traditional sources of American business 
dynamism is the perpetual flux of market entries and exits, providing 
a steady renewal of market players. This elixir of industrial 
rejuvenation is at its most potent in the high technology sectors 
where newcomers to the market make a disproportionately high 
contribution to new products and processes. Europe presents a 
starkly contrasting picture. More often than not, large established 
firms monopolize the stage thanks to privileged links with the 
national public powers. 
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But, with the new impulses of trade and competition released by 
the removal of non-tariff barriers, market entry opportunities will 
multiply for new firms with new ideas and new competitive 
strengths. The prospect of the renewal of the Community's 
industrial tissue encompasses small and medium-sized companies as 
well. Cooperation between such firms will be encouraged by more 
open market entry, aiding them also to enter the competition for 
global markets. 
Global competition and European comparative advantage 
Of course, from the opposite standpoint, emerges the challenge 
posed to European companies by the rivalry they will face from non-
Community companies on their enlarged home market. The 
expectation must be that this challenge will be sharpened as market 
entry barriers recede. Recent performance of EC firms in competing 
with their Japanese and American rivals for world and European 
markets is far from brilliant. Since the start of the 1980s, 
Community business has seen an erosion of its position on many 
world manufacturing markets, while its two major competitors have 
gained. The Japanese and American advantage is particularly 
pronounced in advanced technology sectors like electrical and 
electronic goods, office automation equipment and data-processing. 
EC companies have resisted better on European markets, but even so 
there is a real danger that in sectors like pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs 
and certain high tech areas the main beneficiaries of market 
integration could be non-Community - be they American, Swiss, 
Japanese or from among the aewly industrialized countries. 
This challenge can be met by the right European business 
strategies. Various factors will be key to the success of the European 
riposte - full exploitation of innovation capacities; the 'first-mover 
advantage' for locally-established companies; full use of 'best-
practice' production processes to consolidate the first-mover market 
advantage; close, durable and costly-to-replace relations between 
local suppliers and clients, etc. 28 It is in these and other ways that 
European specificity, and thus European comparative advantage, can 
assert itself. An ever more potent weapon in the arsenal of 
competitive conflict, Europe-wide standards (for products, processes, 
financial reporting, information etc.) are an essential lever both for 
prising open national markets and then welding them together 
through technological alliances. Of great importance to such alliances 
are EC-sponsored R&D programmes like Esprit which, way beyond 
their monetary significance, are a crucial focus for fusing cross-
frontier innovation and business synergies. 
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6 Maintaining fair competition 
But companies mounting the strategies demanded by the 1992 
challenge need the certainty of clear rules, firmly enforced, for 
playing the European home market game. 
Full realization of the positive effects of integration will indeed 
depend in large part on the maintenance of open competition. 
Assured of this, companies will be more prepared to exploit new 
opportunities. Gains in productivity and lower costs will throughput 
to lower prices, better quality and greater product choice. In short, 
overall economic welfare will improve. 
In this new and blustery climate, however, there is a good chance 
that some of the economy's players will seek various forms of shelter 
from competitive reinvigoration. This happened following the 
removal of tariff barriers, and it is to be expected that the 
Community's authorities will face multiple strategems developed by 
private and public actors to cushion the competitive impact on them, 
eg.: 
• the creation of dominant positions potentially leading to abuses, 
like barriers to new entrants to the market, market sharing, and 
discriminatory behaviour; 
• greater recourse to public interventionism, whether direct or 
indirect, aimed at artificially sustaining national champions or 
preventing access to certain markets or activities. 
To address these problems, the Community needs to ensure 
credible enforcement of effective rules, applicable evenly to all, 
including to non-EC companies seeking short cuts to the profits 
generated by the integrated market. The Rome Treaty's provisions 
against public and private non-competitive behaviour will need to be 
applied in a manner consistent with the needs of the new market 
environment - and also to areas where its application is as yet in its 
early days. 
A case in point is provided by the service sectors. As their 
deregulation gathers force, the advantages offered by the new 
dimension of the European home market become clearer. National 
markets appear less and less sufficient as a framework for exploiting 
the new competitive potential ushered in by liberalization. In sectors 
like telecommunications, air transport and financial services, the 
maximum play of EC-wide competition must be ensured, constrained 
only by issues of public interest like consumer and user safety, and 
the continued supply of essential services. 
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10 The global impact of the 1992 
programme on the European economy 
- a macro-economic analysis of the 
gains from market integration 
The supply-side shock: the macro-economic perspective 
The Community's total gains from market integration, spelt out in 
chapter 9, can also be looked at through another, broader prism. 
From this wider angle, a more general picture emerges of the effects 
of the 1992 programme on the European economy's main indicators 
- on aggregates like gross domestic product, employment and 
inflation. To the micro-economic analysis of the preceding chapter is 
now added an outline of 1992's impact in a macro-economic 
perspective. 
In one sense, by its sheer size, the supply-side shock administered 
by the White Paper programme is of macro-economic proportions. 
Although essentially aimed at business managers, the programme has 
undeniable implications for the managers of the general economy. It 
offers them a stronger basic economic performance and thus greater 
margins within which to conduct overall economic policy. Macro-
economic strategy can be used as an amplifier to magnify the supply-
side effects of the micro-economic manifesto set out in the White 
Paper. 
Brief consideration of four examples serves to illustrate how 
growth in the EC is not just hampered directly by micro-economic 
constraints like non-tariff barriers, but also by macro-economic 
constraints operating at the level of the general economy: 
i) Public finances: although now under better control, budget 
deficits continue by their size (still 4.4% of Gdp in 1987 after 
peaking at 5.5% in 1982) to put inordinate upward pressure on 
long-term interest rates, thereby penalizing productive in-
vestment, business activity, future growth and employment 
prospects. 
ii) The external constraint : while for the EC as a whole the current 
trade balance has been positive since 1984 ( 1.1% of Gdp in 
1987), deficits in some countries may constrain future growth. 
More important, the situation conceals a competitive warning : 
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in manufacturing, particularly high tech, European companies 
are steadily losing markets to Japan and the US. An 
underpriced dollar adds to this threat. 
iii) Inflation, or the fear of its return despite the downward trend in 
the EC price index (13.4% in 1980, 7% in 1984, 3.2% in 1987), 
continues to dampen the outlook for economic growth. 
iv) Unemployment: medium-term policies for sustainable economic 
growth are still inhibited by fears of their short-term impact on 
jobs, despite the stronger employment outlook they herald in 
the longer-run. 
As the macro-economic analysis shows, all four of these major 
constraints on European growth will be significantly loosened by EC 
market integration, even if, in the case of employment, the gains -
and considerable gains they are by any measure - will come in the 
medium term. 
The methodology used in the analysis is described in detail 
elsewhere. 29 Suffice it to note here that it uses models which enable 
simulation of the main macro-economic mechanisms. These models 
enable not only the quantification of the macro-economic consequences 
of the 1992 programme but also the ways in which these effects will 
be channelled through the Community economy as a whole. 
The analysis, whose results are summarised in the following pages 
(and in Table 10.1 on p.98), bases its quantification of these effects 
on an examination of four major aspects: 30 
• removal of customs barriers (section 1) 
• opening up procurement markets (section 2) 
• liberalisation of financial services (section 3) 
• the supply-side effects: business strategies reacting to market 
integration and tougher competition (section 4). 
Taken individually, each of these effects on the Community will 
tend to be magnified, or alternatively diminished, by the general 
workings of the EC economy - or by what might be called its macro-
dynamic effects. 31 With this in mind, the chapter's final section 
looks at two general types of outcome: the macro-economic impact of 
market integration 'in the raw', ie. unassisted by economic policy; 
and second, the further potential for gains which would materialize if 
the additional leeway created by the removal of constraints were 
exploited by accompanying measures of general economic policy. 
1 The removal of border controls 
The removal of border controls will lead to downward pressures on 
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prices for intra-EC traded goods and services as a result of excess 
costs being eliminated (costs linked to border delays and red tape, 
see chapter 2 for details). Its macro-economic impact stems in large 
part from this price drop. Imports originating elsewhere in the EC 
will gain in competitivity in relation to items produced nationally or 
imported from outside the Community. This will lead to two 
corresponding types of substitution: intra-EC imports for national 
goods, intra-EC imports for extra-EC imports. There will be an 
improvement of each EC country's terms of trade as import prices 
drop (meaning that the same level of exports will buy more imports), 
and a positive impact on the trade balance of the Community as a 
whole. As a result, there could be an increase in EC Gdp of around 
0.33% in the medium term. 
By comparison to the initial savings from removing the direct costs 
of frontier formalities (see again Chapter 2), gains of the macro-
dynamic type are likely to be limited. Indeed, job losses in customs-
related areas and their knock-on effects might even lead to a slightly 
negative impact in the short-term, although this will be more than 
offset by significant improvements in the longer-run. 
Abolition of customs barriers will have a favourable effect on 
public finances. On top of the short-term savings in expenditure on 
customs administration comes a medium-term rise in tax revenue, 
reflecting the boost to business activity given by frontier facilitation. 
The improvement in the balance of public finances should be around 
0.2% of Gdp in the medium-term. 
There will be a salutory impact on inflation. Any upward 
pressures on prices caused by greater economic activity will be far 
outweighed by the improvement in business costs and terms of trade 
noted above. A net deflationary effect of around 1% in price levels is 
expected for the medium term. 
Yet, despite these quantified gains, the greatest impact is to be 
expressed qualitatively rather than in figures. For the integrated 
market to be credible, the barriers to be eliminated are psychological 
as well as economic. The removal of border formalities will provide 
the EC's economic actors with the symbolic certainty that the 
European home market is here to stay. 
2 Opening up procurement markets 
Liberalization of procurement markets, also strong in symbolic 
impact, will by and large have much greater measurable effect on the 
general economy than removal of customs barriers. Its macro-
economic consequences will reverberate through the three main 
actors involved: public enterprises, public administrations and 
companies supplying public markets. 
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For public enterprises (providing eg. transport, energy, telecom 
services), procurement liberalization should mean big reductions in 
purchasing and investment costs, as capital goods in particular 
become cheaper under the competitive pressure of foreign· suppliers 
(for examples, see Chapter 3). In a competitive environment, the 
downward push on their costs will in many sectors throughput to the 
prices they charge and this, in turn, will have a sizeable ripple effect 
in the rest of the economy. The main macro-economic impact will 
thus be two-fold - a downward pressure on the general price level 
and an upward push given to the EC's competitive position with the 
outside world. 
Public administrations will reap two principal rewards - budget 
savings and larger tax revenues sparked by the thrust to business 
activity given by the newly-created competitive situation. With 
greater financial room for manoeuvre, governments should have 
three main options: reduce public debts, ease taxation, or directly 
boost demand. The first would by and large postpone the expected 
benefits, while either of the last two choices would mean direct 
support to growth and jobs. 
For some traditional suppliers of public markets the story is 
different: they will need to reorganize and their cost structure will come 
under pressure. Moreover, there will be subsequent gains from these 
developments which will not be restricted to public markets. As a 
result, the beneficial effects will be felt on the market as a whole and 
thus serve to strengthen the macro-economic impacts described above. 
Opening public procurement should, of itself and without 
accompanying measures of macro-economic support, mean an 
increase in Gdp of 0.5% and, in the process, provide nearly 400,000 
new jobs in the medium-term. The growth prospect stems essentially 
from price reductions made by public enterprises and their knock-on 
effect on domestic and external demand. 
In addition to the bonus for employment, growth in Gdp will be 
accompanied by improvement in all the other main indicators. The 
downward pressure on prices exerted by public enterprises should 
have a general deflationary impact of as much as 1.4% over the 
medium run. Gains in competitivity should lead to a slight 
strengthening of the Community's external position ( + 0.1% of 
Gdp). The medium-term gain for public finances would be more 
substantial ( + 0. 3% of Gdp ). 
Once again, beyond the measured gains from EC public 
procurement liberalization lies another reality of immeasurable 
significance. This is that in opening up national markets, governments 
will be publicly nailing their colours to the mast of EC market 
integration, and thereby placing a vote of confidence in the supply 
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side of the economy which business is likely to return in pursuit of 
its self-interest. 
3 :..iberalization of financial services 
The economic effect of liberalizing these sectors - banking, 
insurance and securities services - is likely to be large even in its 
primary form. This is essentially due to the competitive shock 
administered to overpricing in the wake of market integration. But 
when scaled up to take full account of the role played by financial 
services in overall business activity, the overall macro-dynamic effect 
appears even more significant than outlined in Chapter 6. 
Amplification of the basic effect will in large part be due to the 
lower cost of credit. Reduction in capital costs will encourage 
productive investment and thus sharply increase growth potential. 
Capital shortages, which could restrict the overall benefits from the 
integrated market, will be avoided. Liberalization of financial 
services, with the crucial supporting role they play right across the 
economy, should guarantee the wider availability of credit and better 
allocation of financial resources. A particular effect of general 
significance is the boost that cheaper credit should give to spending 
on housing, a sector known for its job-creating potential. 
Beyond these gains, largely stemming from the lending activity of 
the banking sector, is the impact of the general lowering in the prices 
of financial services, in particular to industrial consumers whose 
costs thus diminish. The result will be to radiate a deflationary surge 
through the economy at large. This in turn will stimulate domestic 
demand by increasing purchasing power, and boost external demand 
by improving European competitivity. Households will benefit 
doubly. They will pay less for financial services and will gain from 
the general drop in prices. 
Small wonder, then, that the overall macro-economic consequences 
of liberalising financial services are considerable. In the medium-
term, the process should contribute an extra 1.5% to Community 
Gdp, its deflationary impact on price levels should be around 1.4%, 
and public finances should improve by an amount equal to around 
1% of Gdp, mainly through a reduction in the debt burden. The 
EC's external balance would be subject to two conflicting forces: it 
would improve because of gains in European competitivity, but 
would suffer from the rise in imports, sucked in by higher 
investment and growth. As regards employment, lower financing 
costs might result in a degree of substitution of capital for labour, 
meaning short-term job losses, but the outlook created by new 
economic growth more than compensates for this. Medium-term 
estimates are for new jobs to increase by nearly half a million. 
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4. The supply-side effects: business strategies reacting to a new 
competitive environment 
Putting a figure on the strategic response of the corporate sector to 
the new competitive environment bequeathed by EC market 
integration is a complex matter. Indeed, even with a clear view of the 
1992 Community market, it is difficult to predict with accuracy the 
nature of business reactions to it, let alone quantify them as a macro-
economic aggregate. 
To tackle these problems, various illustrative scenarios were 
developed32 - illustrative in the sense that they describe phenomena 
that are likely but not certain to occur. They seek to strike a balance 
between overstatement and understatement. They may make over-
optimistic assumptions about the degree to which companies will 
convert market opportunities into economic success; on the other 
hand, they err by caution in not including all sectors and all effects 
in their aggregation. Thus the analysis looks at effects related to the 
direct costs of non-tariff barriers, to economies of scale, and at pure 
competition effects (lowering of monopoly profits, raising management 
efficiency). But it leaves to one side the impact of competition on 
investment and on innovation, 33 nor does it take account of 
transborder link-ups. 
Two essential channels are taken by supply-side effects, which are 
intrinsically micro-economic, to project themselves onto the macro-
economic stage: 
By reducing prices. Price reductions will develop in relation to 
the lowering of production costs. Competitive pressures will force 
companies into actively embarking on cost-cutting programmes 
through rationalization and improved economies of scale. Through 
inter-industry links, the lowering of upstream prices will 
reinforce reduction in downstream prices. 
- By productivity gains in the factors of production, be they the 
result of more efficient allocation of resources (human, financial 
and technological), or industrial restructuring (economies of 
scale), or again improved internal business organization. 
All the macro-economic consequences of the supply-side shock 
derive from these two factors, which in turn are conflicting in 
impact. Thus, the positive medium-term effects stemming from 
price reductions may be attenuated in the short-term by productivity 
gains. On the one hand, lower prices should stimulate domestic 
demand by real increases in income (particularly of households), and 
boost external demand by the gains they mean for European 
competitivity. But productivity gains imply cost savings in the 
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factors of production -labour and capital - and these savings in turn 
have a depressant effect on demand. 
From the interlocking dynamics of these two factors emerges a 
scenario of major medium-term gains to be won after initial 
challenges are met. Thus, in the short-term, productivity gains 
might mean a degree of job loss, but this dip in employment would 
be progressively filled and then spectacularly built on. The estimates 
for the medium-term are that the gains in the supply-side's efficiency 
and flexibility will lead to the creation of nearly a million new jobs. 
The short-term difficulties are inseparable from the longer-run 
benefits. To be eaten the cake has got to be baked. 
If European business realises the potential gains on offer, the 
macro-economic effect should be very considerable. Supply-side 
success should mean the addition of 2% to Gdp in the medium-term, 
coupled with a substantial easing of the constraints on economic 
growth: a steep drop in prices (estimated at more than 2%), and 
improvements in public finances and in the EC's external position 
respectively equal to 0.6% and 0.4% of Gdp. A longer-term view 
would reveal a more favourable outcome as a result of a cumulative 
process. 
5 Real and potential macro-economic gains from EC market 
integration 
The overall picture is very positive. Whatever the effect analysed-
removal of customs barriers, opening up public procurement, 
liberalization of financial services, or the supply-side effects - the 
macro-economic results appear consistently favourable for the 
Community in the medium-term. 
Thus, according to our estimates (Table 10.1 ), EC market 
integration will in the medium-term: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
trigger a major relaunch of economic activity, adding on average X 
4.5% to EC Gdp; 
simultaneously cool the economy, deflating consumer prices by an 
average of 6.1%; 
relax budgetary and external constraints, improving the balance of 
public finances by an average equivalent to 2.2% of Gdp and 
boosting the EC's external position by around 1% of Gdp; 
boost employment, creating 1.8 million new jobs; although unable 
of itself to make big inroads into the present stock of 
unemployment, the effect would nonetheless be to reduce the 
jobless rate by around 1.5 percentage points. 
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The trigger-point: removal of market barriers 
The trigger-point for all these gains (graphically presented in the 
flow-chart below) should not be forgotten. It is the removal of non-
tariff barriers. This is synonymous with the reduction in production 
costs which, under the pressure of strengthened competition, exerts 
downward pressure on prices. From this starting point come: 
• purchasing power gains, which stimulate economic activity; 
• competitivity gains which, in addition to providing another 
growth stimulant, improve the external balance; 
• the initial lowering of prices, not just inhibiting demand-push 
inflation, but actually leading to deflation; 
• the easing of public deficits, under the dual impact of open 
public procurement and economic regeneration. 
Beyond this, in the longer-term, further gains are in prospect as 
the 'virtuous circle' effect (see also Chapter 9, section 4) once again 
takes hold. Under the pressure of competition and the continental 
broadening of the home market, companies will be engaged in a 
Table 10.1 Macroeconomic consequences of EC market integration for the 
Community in the medium term 
Customs Public Fmancial Supply- Total 
formal- procure- services side Average Spread 
ities ment effects1 value 
Relative changes (%) 
Gdp 0.4 0.5 1.5 2.1 4.5 (3.2- 5.7) 
Consumer prices -1.0 -1.4 -1.4 -2.3 --6.1 (-4.5- -7.7) 
Absolute changes 
Employment 
(millions) 200 350 400 850 1800 (1300 - 2300) 
Budgetary balance 
(% point of Gdp) 0.2 0.3 1.1 0.6 2.2 (1.5 - 3.0) 
External balance 
(% point of Gdp) 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.0 (0.7- 1.3) 
Source: HERMES (EC Commission and national teams) and INTERLINK (OECD) 
economic models2 
Notes: 
1 Based on a scenario which includes the supply-side effects estimated by the 
consultants, economies of scale in manufacturing industry and competition effects 
(monopoly rent, X-inefficiency). 
2 The INTERLINK simulations have been carried out by the Commission 
departments. The OECD takes no responsibility for the use of the model. 
98 
permanent search for lower costs. The beneficial effects stemming 
from the reduction in production costs and productivity gains thus 
become a self-sustaining process. 
All these gains, it should be emphasized, would be achieved in a 
situation where macro-economic policy remained unchanged. They 
thus represent the raw, unaccompanied benefits to the Community 
economy of EC market integration, expressed in macro-economic 
terms. 
Economic outlook and the policy variable 
This prospect of relaxing the major economic constraints- inflation, 
unemployment, public and trade deficits - in turn opens up a further 
and durable potential for growth in the medium and longer term: ie. 
beyond the raw benefits. 
Take, for example, the easing of pressure on public deficits. This 
may lead governments to consider policies of accelerated repayments 
of public debts, in which case the return to balanced budgets would 
also be accelerated. But even in a scenario of stringent orthodoxy, 
where first priority is given to balancing the public books, greater 
room would become available in the longer run for consideration of 
more expansionist policy options. The relaxing of economic 
constraints might also lead to shorter term action of this type, eg. 
lowering taxes or participation in major European infrastructure 
projects. In this case, untying the budgetary constraint would clearly 
have an immediate and positive impact on the level of economic 
activity. Similarly, any improvement in the external balance or drop 
in the inflation rate means, sooner or later, an injection of economic 
growth. 
Clearly, given the size of budget deficits in the EC, the positive 
impact of market integration on public finances (estimated at 2.2% of 
Gdp) will play a key role in whatever economic policy is chosen. The 
main effects of three distinct policy scenarios are outlined in Table 
10.2. Each of them, to a greater or lesser extent, uses the budgetary 
surplus generated by the 1992 programme. 
The full conversion of the budgetary gain into economic growth 
(scenario 1) is mentioned here purely for illustrative purposes 
because its implementation, although leading to a medium-term rise 
in Gdp of 7.5% and in employment of almost 6 million, would lead 
to a significant deterioration of the external balance by an amount 
equal to 0.5% of Gdp. In the second policy scenario, possibly erring 
on the side of caution, the external constraint is fully removed and, 
using only part of the budgetary gains, there still results an increase 
in Gdp of almost 6.5% and job creation of the order of 4 million. 
The third scenario, situated half-way between the first two, may 
99 
MARKET 
INTEGRATION 
Opening of 
.....-----+-1 public 
procurement 
Elimination 
of border 
controls :-.~ ~----~----. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Uberalisationl---11---1 Supefpfelyct-sside ,, , ______ ,~:, __ .. ,
..--1-- of financial 
• services : 
Dynamisation 
of 
investment 
Lowering of costs 
l-4--competition 
+ 
:- ---------------------~ Lowering of prices 
i / .----L...----, 
) • • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• i Gains in Gains Improvement 
1 natial income in ~ of 
1 purchasing power competitiveness trade balance 
~L 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
I (attenuatin~ / (attenuating i 
• I • Lde~~~a:~uir-- ~~~~~e J----,----rrr,,d~~~~~fi) _____ J 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
inflation) I ~ 
Improvement in 
public budget 
balance 
Job (attenuating l • factor: : 
creation '~-------------------------customs-related job loss, 
gains in labour productivity) 
Chart 10.1 Principal macroeconomic mechanisms activated in the course of 
completing the internal market 
100 
Table 10.2 Macro-economic consequences of EC market integration accompanied by economic policy measures (medium-term) 
Name of 
economic 
policy 
Margin for 
manoeuvre 
exploited 
Economic consequences 
Without 
accompanying 
measures (see 
Table 10.1) 
With accompanying 
measures1 
Margin of accuracy 
- Public budget 
balance 
- External balance 
-Price 
red uctions2 
Gdp 
(in%) 
4.5 
7.5 
6.5 
7.0 
Consumer 
prices (in%) 
--6.1 
-4.3 
-4.9 
-4.5 
Employment 
(in millions) 
1.8 
5.7 
4.4 
5.0 
± 30% 
Source: HERMES (EC Commission and national teams) and INTERLINK (OECD) economic models3 
Notes: 
Public budget 
balance (in% 
point Gdp) 
2.2 
0 
0.7 
0.4 
External balance 
(in% point Gdp) 
1.0 
-0.5 
0 
-0.2 
1 Accompanying economic policy measures (increased public investment, income tax reductions) are calibrated so that all the room for manoeuvre 
created by market integration for alternatively public balances, external balances and price reductions is fully used. 
2 In this case, accompanying economic policy was calibrated so as to use 25% of the deflationary reservoir created by consumer price reductions. 
Full use of the margin for manoeuvre created by price reductions could have led to a totally unrealistic outcome (including, in particular, massive 
deterioration in the EC's external position). 
3 The INTERLINK simulations have been carried out by the Commission departments. The OECD takes no responsibility for the use of the 
model. 
be considered the most plausible. It involves partial exploitation of 
the margins of manoeuvre created by both price deflation and 
budgetary gains, but makes slightly more than full use of the EC's 
external balance. This mid-way economic policy response to 
European market integration leads to striking results. There would 
be a medium-term increase in Gdp of 7%, unaccompanied by 
inflation, and the creation of 5 million new jobs. And it would still 
leave governments with a hefty budgetary gain from market 
integration (equal to 0. 7% of Gdp) on which to cushion their concern 
for financial orthodoxy. 
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11 Getting the most out of the European 
home market - guidelines for 
. 
maxtmum success 
The potential inherent in the 1992 programme for providing the 
Community and its member states with major economic gains has 
been outlined in the preceding pages. Whether expressed in terms of 
economic welfare (Chapter 9) or leading macro-economic indicators 
like growth, employment and inflation (Chapter 10), this message 
emerges with unequivocal clarity. 
Whatever their different starting points, and even granting a fairly 
broad margin of error, the micro-economic and macro-economic 
estimates converge on medium-term gains of around 4%-7% of EC 
gross domestic product. Among the various indicators of this 
success, the most crucial is without doubt employment. While recent 
years have often been marked by lengthy debates about demand-led 
growth, our analysis shows that the improvements to the supply-side 
of the economy set out in the Community's 1992 manifesto is the 
sine qua non for a stronger European labour market outlook. 34 
Supply-side policies will favour job creation precisely because their 
effect is to reduce costs and prices. These reductions will lead to 
growth in demand, growth in output, and thus growth in 
employment. Moreover, strengthening the supply-side's flexibility 
and competitivity - in other words, strengthening European business 
- will additionally magnify the beneficial impact of policies seeking 
economic growth through stimulating demand. 
That said, the precise time-frame for realizing in full the beneficial 
effects of the main measures set out in the 1992 White Paper is. 
diffict:lt to establish. Moreover, it differs depending on the measure 
considered. Thus the impact of removing the delays caused by 
border formalities is short-term, while the impulse given by market 
integration to, for example, industrial restructuring and innovation 
will result in longer term benefits. Similarly, while significant job 
creation is expected in the medium-term, there are risks of short-
term losses. 
Getting an accurate handle on the time-frame for these gains is 
complicated by a further factor. This is the uncertainty linked to the 
dynamics which produce the two main types of beneficial effect from 
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market integ~ation. The first type of effect is a once-and-for-all shock 
leading to Gdp growth, a good example of which is again the removal 
of intra-EC customs formalities. But the second type is less easy to 
pin down. Examples of this include product and process innovation 
which will modify - upwards - the entire trajectory of EC growth 
and economic welfare throughout the 1990s and beyond into the 
twenty-first century. 
The challenge - political and social, not just economic 
The speed with which the gains are realized will of course be 
influenced by the costs of adjusting to the market environment in 
which the benefits can be fully reaped. These adjustments, clearly a 
substantial challenge for the authors of the 1992 programme, take 
various forms. Changes in price rigidities, in the productivity of 
factors of production (labour, capital), in the economic policies of 
EC member governments - these are so many potential threats to 
protected positions, be they those of companies, industries, regions 
or nations. Restructuring entire sectors, shifts in employment, new 
demands on labour mobility and training, the regional distribution of 
new wealth - these are so many factors whose adjustment to the new 
market conditions carries their own social and political costs. The 
road to market integration, however paved with good intentions, 
leads to 1992 by way of hard decisions rather than easy options. 
Guidelines for success 
Realizing the full economic potential of the 1992 programme means 
changes in the behaviour of the European economy's main actors and 
the pursuance of appropriate policies by EC governments. 
Business If EC market integration is to succeed, so must business. 
The degree of its success depends on the strategic response of 
Europe's companies to the market challenge, and on their ability to 
seize the new opportunities on offer (see Chapter 9). Other 
challenges facing corporate management are how to help make 
industrial relations less conflictual, encourage employee involvement 
in the life of the company, and ensure that workers share in the 
productivity gains jointly achieved with management. Most important, 
business must keep the pressure on governments to live up to their 
1992 commitments. 
Competition policy If home market conditions are to be maintained, 
so must a firm and credible European competition policy. Without 
it, there can be no guarantee that lower production costs will be 
passed on in the form of lower prices. And without that, the 
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stimulus given to demand by the supply-side, taking the dual form 
of higher domestic purchasing power and greater external competi-
tivity, will be still-born. Beyond this, rigorous maintenance of the 
Community's competititive processes is the central regulator of the 
market's machinery for technology innovation, product quality and 
good management. 
Wealth redistribution If the new rewards are not shared fairly, the 
EC home market will rest on a brittle skein of regional and social 
tensions. There are strong arguments for measures to attenuate the 
negative impact of market integration on wealth distribution, and to 
ensure that differences in economic performance between EC 
countries are not intensified. At the same time, it should not be 
taken for granted that the impact will be inordinately negative, 
prefiguring an outlook of unbridled economic Darwinism. Indeed, 
recent developments in trade theory35 and past experience, eg. 
with the removal of intra-EC tariff barriers, indicate that re-
distributive effects in the wake of freer trade need not be excessive. 
Undoubtedly, however, assistance will be needed for the Community's 
declining regions and labour affected by industrial restructuring. 
At the same time, the potential gains from market integration 
should help reinforce the consensus around the 1992 programme 
which European employers and labour began to forge in 1985. The 
new prospect of dynamic growth rates leading to major medium-
term job creation should also assist the process. Beyond this, 
however, as indicated in a recent Commission report36 there is a 
need to examine the sector-by-sector impact of removing non-tariff 
barriers, and to envisage accompanying social policy measures across 
a range of fields: vocational training and mobility; labour market 
flexibility; and more intensive use of the Community's social and 
regional funds. The extent to which the 1992 programme can attract 
economic and social cohesion around it will be key to its chances of 
success. It will be built neither on a centralized Community strategy 
nor disparate national practice, but on a flexible approach anchored 
in a common core of minimum social arrangements. 
General economic policy If the full potential of the EC internal 
market is to be realized, non-inflationary policies of macro-economic 
growth, convergently pursued, seem ineluctable. As shown in 
Chapter 10, such policies could be undertaken on a largely risk-free 
basis, whether the governmental priority is set on public finances, 
consumer prices, employment or the external position. But, in the 
1992 home market, it is impossible to conceive how such policies can 
be pursued other than on a convergent basis. Otherwise, the home 
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market will cease very rapidly to be a home market. Its completion 
means a very high level of economic interdependence - free trade in 
goods, services, people and capital between its constituent countries. 
This interdependence cannot be sustained in a macro-economic 
policy void. 
In the past, there has been no shortage of examples of how 
deflationary spirals can be triggered between closely interdependent 
countries pursuing divergent economic policies. Experience also 
shows how countries, linked in such close relationships, often choose 
to resolve policy divergences or trade imbalances by recessionary 
rather than expansionist measures. The well-known beggar-thy-
neighbour reflex passes on part of the buck to trading partners, in 
the shape of losses in competitivity and contracting export markets. 
By contrast, the growth option leads to a spread of new wealth. The 
first policy leads to an export of costs, the second to an export of 
benefits. 
To avoid the deflationary threat, strengthening the coordination 
between EC member states' economic policies is a commonsense 
imperative. Also, a European home market is likely to increase 
exchange rate fluctuations: intensification of intra-EC trade and 
liberalisation of trans-border capital movements - indispensable as 
they are for achieving the gains of market integration - may well 
heighten monetary instability. Success in creating the internal 
market thus condemns the Community to strengthen the European 
monetary system and build the institutional framework needed to 
guarantee intra-EC exchange rate stability. 
Governments If they fail to give credibility to the 1992 programme, 
it is hard to see how or why business should respond and realise its 
potential gains. Companies will not launch themselves into major 
strategic choices without evidence of the political commitment on 
which they are in part based. 
The White Paper programme, a sort of political guarantee of 
European commercial risk, requires rapid enactment. More than 
this, governments need to show that the legislation it contains is 
irreversible once enacted. The law's delays, muddled decision-
making, obscure compromises - failure, in short, to seize the 
political opportunity today - will be repaid in kind by the missed 
market opportunity of tomorrow. What is Europe's greatest 
opportunity is within its collective grasp. In seizing it Europeans will 
not only do themselves justice now, but bequeath a legacy of 
durable wealth and stability to future generations. 
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Summary and conclusions 
Ecu at 1985 value, the year of most of the statistical evidence used in the 
research. The centrepoint of the estimated spread of Ecu 174 - 258 billion is Ecu 
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As at mid-March 1988 the exchange rate of the Ecu was as follows: 
1 Ecu = 0.671 £ sterling 
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= 1.217 US$ 
2 Commission of the EC, White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, Brussels, 
1985. 
3 See also Commission of the EC, Efficiency, Stabiltty and Equity- A Strategy for the 
Evolution of the Economic System of the European Community, Report of a study 
group appointed by the EC Commission and presided by T. Padoa-Schioppa, 
Brussels, 1987; Commission des CE, La dimension sociale du marchi interieur, 
rapport d'etape du Groupe interservices preside par M. J. Degimbe, Brussels, 
1988. 
Chapter 1 
4 Commission of the EC, White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, op. cit. 
Chapter 2 
5· Commission of the EC, Research on the 'Cost of Non-Europe'- The Completion of 
the Internal Market: a survey of European industry's perception of the likely effects, by 
G. Nerb, Brussels, (forthcoming). 
6 Commission of the EC, The Economics of 1992 -An Assessment of the Potential 
Economic Effects of Completing the Internal Market of the EC, Brussels, (Part C, 
p.3.2.3), March 1988. 
7 According to information from the Association Europeenne de Vente par 
Correspondance, Brussels, February 1986. 
Chapter 3 
8 Calculations based on Independent European Programme Group (I.E.P.G.) 
Report, report of a group of independent experts presided by H. Vredeling, 
NATO, Brussels, 1987. 
Chapter 4 
9 Commission of the EC, Research on the 'Cost of Non-Europe'- The Completion of 
the Internal Market: a survey of European industry's perception of the likely effects, 
op. cit. 
10 ibid. 
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11 Speech by European Commissioner K.-H. Narjes to the Council of Ministers, 
1983. 
12 'Cassis de Dijon'-Judgment by the European Court of Justice, CJEC 20.2.1979 
(Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fUr Branntwein), 120/78:(1979) 
ECR 649. 
Chapter 6 
13 For the part played by the financial services sector in calculating the overall gains 
to the European economy from the elimination of market-related costs, see 
Chapter 9. 
14 France Telecom, no. 63, October 1987, p. 47. 
Chapter 7 
15 These figures are to be interpreted with caution, because prices may reflect 
quality differences. Furthermore, R&D costs are sometimes paid out of a 
different budget and thus not reflected in the competitive world market prices. 
Thus, a complete move of European equipment prices to the competitive world 
market levels indicated might not sustain the amount of R&D necessary. 
Viable long term competitive price levels are more likely to be 20% above the 
world prices indicated. 
Chapter 8 
16 For full treatment of the micro-economic analysis, see Commission of the EC, 
The Economics of 1992 - An Assessment of the Potential Economic Effects of 
Completing the Internal Market of the EC, op.cit. 
Chapter 9 
17 Boston Consulting Group, Les mecanismes fondamentaux de la comphuivite, 
Hommes et Techniques, 1981. 
18 For a full analysis see Commission of the EC, The Econom1cs of 1992 - An 
Assessment of the Potential Economic Effects of Completing the Internal Market of the 
EC, op.cit. 
19 A more restrictive hypothesis for high barrier sectors is that the level of price 
peaks are only reduced by half of the gap separating them from the average of the 
two lowest prices. In this latter case, savings are estimated at around 2.8% of 
Gdp. 
20 Commission of the EC, Research on the 'Cost of Non-Europe' - An Assessment 
based on a Formal Model of Imperfect Competit1on and Economies of Scale, by 
Smith, A., Venables, A., Brussels, (forthcoming). 
21 Scherer, F.M., Industnal Market Structure and Economic Performance, second edn, 
Houghton Mifflin. 
22 Commission of the EC, Research on the 'Cost of Non-Europe' - Compet1lion and 
Innovation, study carried out for the Commission of the EC by Geroski, P.A., 
Brussels, (forthcoming); and Kamien, M.l., and Schwartz, N.L., Market 
Structure and Innovallons, Cambridge University Press, 1982 
23 Commission of the EC, The Completion of the Internal Market: a survey of 
European industry's perception of the likely effects, op. cit. 
24 Commission of the EC, 16th Report on Compemion Policy, Brussels, 1987, Part 
Four. 
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25 For further examples see de Woot, Ph., 'Capacite strategique et performance 
economique a long terme des entreprises europeennes dans les secteurs a haute 
technologie', Projet Penelope for the Commission of the EC, FAST- Occasional 
Papers, Brussels, 1987. 
26 Commission of the EC, 16th Report on Competition Policy, op.cit. 
27 See Commission of the EC, Research on the 'Cost of Non-Europe'- Obstacles to 
Transborder Business ActiviOt, Study carried out for the Commission of the EC by 
European Research Associates & Prognos, Brussels, (forthcoming). 
28 Jacquemin, A., The New Industrial Organisation, MIT and Oxford University 
Press, 1987 
Chapter 10 
29 For a detailed description of the two models HERMES (EC Commission and 
national teams) and INTERLINK (OECD) see Commission of the EC, The 
Economics of 1992 -An Assessment of the Potential Economic Effects of Completing 
the Internal Market of the EC, op.cit. 
30 See Catinat, M., 'Radioscopie du grand marche interieur', Economie Prospectwe 
Internationale, 1988, No. 33, CEPII, 1er trimestre, Documentation fran'>aise. 
31 ibid. 
32 See Commission of the EC, The Economics of 1992- An Assessment of the Potential 
Economic Effects of Completmg the Internal Market of the EC, op.cit. 
33 See Geroski, P.A., Jacquemin, A., 'Corporate Competitiveness in Europe', 
Economtc Policy, No. 1, November, 1985, pp. 170-217; and Jacquemin, A., The 
New Industrial Organisation, op. cit. 
Chapter 11 
34 For further details see Chapter 10, in particular Table 10.2. 
35 Helpman, E., and Krugman., P., Market Structure and Foretgn Trade: increasing 
returns, imperfect competition and the international economy, MIT Press, 1985. 
36 For further details see Commission des CE, La dimension sociale du marche 
interieur, rapport d'etape du Groupe interservices preside par M. J. Degimbe, 
op.cit. 
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APPENDICES 
PRESENTATION OF 
THE 'RESEARCH ON 
THE COST OF 
NON-EUROPE' 

Appendix 1 The structure of the research 
The purpose of the research was to provide a solid body of scientific 
analysis regarding the costs of European market fragmentation, and 
thus the benefits on offer following the removal of barriers targetted 
by the Commission's White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, 
which was adopted by the European Community summit in 1985. 
A preliminary to embarking on the research was the establishment 
of a steering committee, bringing together the multi-faceted 
expertise needed to effectively oversee the project and the reports 
undertaken for it by independent consultants. As its name suggests, 
the committee helped to steer a course through the uncharted seas 
of inexistent basic data and methodologies. Its combination of 
Commission civil servants, mainly drawn from the two most directly 
concerned departments (directorates-general II and III), and leading 
outside experts proved to be a determining asset in the success of the 
operation. 
At the outset, the committee opted to make two key choices: 
- to limit the scope of the 'non-Europe' research to the market 
and trade barriers to be eliminated by the White Paper 
programme; 
to ensure that the coverage of the individual studies, which were 
to be launched in the course of the project, included the four 
major Community countries, while leaving open the possibility of 
extending this geographical scope on a case by case basis. 
In carrying out the research, whose structure and main participants 
are outlined below, these two choices have been applied with due 
flexibility. In particular, the need to achieve as broad a geographical 
coverage as possible has been satisfied both in many of the individual 
studies and in the industrial survey in which 11,000 enterprises 
across the Community actively participated; and, perhaps more 
significantly still, by the aggregate economic estimates to be found in 
Part II. In addition, to ensure maximum coherence in the 
methodological approach adopted by the project and in the 
presentation of its results, two symposia were held between the 
Commission and the independent consultants in respectively May 
and October 1987. 
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Since the outset of the research, the steering committee gave 
special emphasis to the need to develop analytic tools which would 
enable identification and quantitative evaluation of the dynamic 
effects generated by the eliiPination of non-tariff barriers - effects 
which, it was strongly felt, would provide the most significant 
contribution to the resultant welfare benefits. These tools were 
developed in the early months of the research, when the first sketch 
of what was to become the methodology used in the macro-ec0nomic 
analysis was outlined.The same effort was made for the micro-
economic analysis, starting with a round table of leading economists 
on economies of scale. 
This book represents the most visible part of the results of the 
research project. In the interests of wider circulation, it does not 
treat in detail the methodology used to obtain the results, nor does it 
report all the findings of the basic studies carried out by the 
consultants. Appendix II supplies the list of publications in which 
the detailed results of the research can be found. 
Criticism is expected and welcome. Such an enterprise cannot be 
immune to imperfection and even perhaps error. However the 
overall outcome of the research, which points to very significant 
gains to be derived from European market integration, seem to be 
both accurate and reasonable. It is highly unlikely that the intellec-
tual input of so many leading consultants, academics, officials and 
independent experts would be unanimously pointing in the wrong 
direction. 
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Research on the 'cost of non-Europe' - Basic findings of the 
research 
Volume One Basic studies: Executive summaries 
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The 'cost of non-Europe': Some case studies on technical barriers 
The 'cost of non-Europe': Obstacles to transborder business 
activity 
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The internal markets of North America. Fragmentation and 
integration in the US and Canada 
Series DOCUMENTS 
CB-52-88-485-EN-C ISBN 92-825-7946-8 
Volume Two Studies on the economics of integration 
Table of contents: 
Introduction 
A survey of the economies of scale 
Economies of scale and intra-community trade 
Economies of scale and European integration: The case of Italy 
The costs of non-Europe: An assessment based on a formal model of 
imperfect competition and economies of scale 
Competition and innovation 
Commerce intra-branche: Performance des firmes et analyse des 
echanges commerciaux dans la Communaute europeenne 
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Partial equilibrium calculations of the impact of internal market 
barriers in the European Community 
Consequences macroeconomiques de l'achevement du marche in-
terieur - l'enseignement des modeles macroeconomiques 
Series DOCUMENTS 
CB-52-88-493-EN-C ISBN 92-825-7947-6 
Volume Three The completion of the internal market: a survey of 
European industry's perception of the likely effects 
Series DOCUMENTS 
CB-52-88-502-EN-C ISBN 92-825-7948-4 
(other language versions will also be published) 
The complete series of the full reports, whose Executive Summaries 
are published in Volume One, will be also published by the 
OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES 
L-2985 Luxembourg 
in its series 'DOCUMENTS'. 
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THE BENEFITS OF A SINGLE MARKET 
The failure to achieve a single market within the European Community has 
been costing European industry millions in unnecessary costs and lost 
opportunities. However the programme for the completion of the internal 
market by 1992 is now well under way and this major study, carried out under 
the auspices of the Community, clearly identifies what will be achieved by 
cutting out red tape, breaking down protectionism and removing blocks on 
cross-border activities. 
After producing figures which demonstrate the heavy costs of having 
twelve separate mArkets divided by frontier controls, the study goes on to 
identify and illustrate, for a number of manufacturing and service sectors, the 
immense opportunities for the future which the completion of the internal 
market will open up. 
This book clearly sets out the challenges and benefits of a single unified 
European market looking at opportunities for growth, job creation, economies 
of scale, improved productivity and profitability, healthier competition, profes-
sional and business mobility, stable prices and consumer choice. What is on 
offer is significant. inflation-free growth and the creation of millions of new jobs 
within a single European market of over 320 million people. 
The information contained in this book is of vital interest to anyone 
interested in the political and economic future of the United Kingdom and 
Europe. 
COVER DESIGN: RACHAEL ADAMS 
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